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THE FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1975
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current medical malpractice insurance crisis threatens to disrupt the practice of medicine, the operations of insurance companies,
and ultimately the availability of medical services. Medical doctors in
several states have threatened to strike if legislatures fail to find a way
to halt the drastically increasing costs of medical malpractice insurance
premiums.' Several groups of California doctors staged walkouts to
protest malpractice rates which they considered unsatisfactory. 2 Insurance companies throughout the country are abandoning the malpractice business.3 Patients are troubled by spiraling hospital and doctor
fees and the unnecessary tests, treatments, and consultations ordered by
4
doctors to protect themselves in case of a malpractice claim.
1. Physicians in California, New York, and Rhode Island have indicated that massive
walkouts are inevitable if the cost of medical malpractice insurance coverage is not
reduced. In New York, 1,500 doctors held a demonstration outside the headquarters
of the New York Medical Society to display their dissatisfaction with emergency legislation passed by the New York Legislature. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58. A spokesperson
for the Dade County Medical Association has stated that nearly 3,000 South Florida
doctors are preparing to stage a "work slowdown . . . to protest the high cost of malpractice insurance." Dr. Janice Sherwood stated that "as of Jan. 1, Dade and Broward
and other surrounding counties may well find themselves without physicians because of
a necessary work slowup." Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 14, 1975, at 26, col. 2.
2. A strike by anesthesiologists and surgeons in northern California in May 1975,
resulted in the elimination of all but emergency surgery in two-thirds of the area's
hospitals. Over 4,000 lay-offs of hospital personnel occurred in San Francisco alone. In
the southern part of the state, including Los Angeles, as many as 22,000 beds in 113
hospitals were unoccupied; economic losses were estimated to be $1.1 million per day.
NEwswERK, June 9, 1975, at 58.
3. In 1973 more than 20 companies wrote malpractice insurance in the United States.
Today there are about 10 and only six of these write on a national scale. Rubsamen,
The Malpractice Crisis: How Did We Get There, Can We Get Out?, MODERN MEDICINE,
April 1, 1975, at 34. Over 20 insurance firms which offered malpractice coverage have
terminated such coverage in Florida in the past 5 years. St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 6,
1975, § B, at 1, col. 2.
4.
One of the most pervasive impacts of the medical malpractice problem arises
out of what is commonly called "defensive medicine."
Positive defensive medicine is the conducting of a test or performance of a
diagnostic or therapeutic procedure which is not medically justified but is carried
out primarily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against the threat of medicallegal liability. . . . Negative defensive medicine occurs when a physician
does not perform a procedure or conduct a test because of the physician's fear
of a later malpractice suit, even though the patient is likely to benefit from
the test or procedure in question.
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Nationwide, professional liability insurance premiums for hospitals
rose over 260 percent between 1960 and 1970; for physicians other than
surgeons, 541 percent; and for surgeons almost 950 percent. 5 In Florida,
Argonaut Insurance Company, which supplies group liability insurance
for approximately half of the state's physicians, raised its rates an
average of 96 percent effective January 1, 1975. In April 1975 Argonaut
contended that its solvency was threatened and requested permission to
increase its rates another 95 percent. The company threatened to withdraw coverage immediately if the increase were not approved. On May
19, 1975, however, United States District Court Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat
ordered Argonaut to continue coverage for the remainder of 1975 at
the January 1, 1975, rate. Only one other firm is currently writing new
policies in the state, and its rates for high-risk categories are higher than
Argonaut's.

7

Against this background, and in response to the pressure for a legislative solution to the malpractice situation, lawmakers throughout the
nation have considered a variety of remedial proposals. The 1975
Florida Legislature passed a sweeping reform bill (The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Act) which
was endorsed and promptly signed into law by Governor Reubin
Askew.8 Satisfaction with the new law was short-lived, however, and
U.S.

DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION

AND WELFARE,

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

COMMISSION

ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW PUBLICATION No. (OS) 73-88, at 14 (1973) (hereinafter
HEW REPORT. It has been estimated that patients pay as much as $5 billion to $7 billion
annually for defensive medicine. The Washington Post, April 25, 1975, § A, at 26, col. 1.
An American Medical Association study in 1972 showed that 70% of all physicians ordered
extra laboratory tests, X-rays, and other diagnostic procedures to protect themselves in
case of future lawsuits. Whitney, Doctors, Lawyers Disagree on 'Orgy' of Lawsuits, St.
Petersburg Times, Jan. 21, 1975, § B, at 10, col. 1.
5. National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington Report for State Legislatures, April 10, 1975, at 1.
6. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Florida Medical Ass'n, No. 75-140 Civ-J-T (M.D. Fla.,
May 19, 1975). Because Argonaut established neither inadequate rates nor insolvency
the court held:
The intervening physicians are thus entitled to the maintenance of their insurance in full force throughout 1975 at the January 1st rates. . . . As a practical
matter, malpractice insurance is not available from other sources, and unless
Argonaut's coverage remains in force many of the intervening physicians will
become uninsured.
Id. at 8.
7. American Medical News, Feb. 24, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
8. The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9. In
signing the bill into law on May 20, Governor Askew commented:
This new law will help us avert a crisis in the delivery of vital health care services
in Florida and give us the time we need to further evaluate all the many aspects
of the malpractice issue. Only experience will tell how well this approach will
work.
Florida Times Union, May 21, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 3.
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doctors in the state complain that the new legislation will not adequately relieve the situation.9
This note analyzes the reasons frequently given to explain the
malpractice problem," and explains and critiques the malpractice legislation passed by the 1975 Florida Legislature.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE PROBLEM

The rising cost of malpractice insurance is often attributed to the
fact that the number of malpractice claims filed against doctors and
health-care facilities has increased drastically over the past 10 years. 1 '
The conclusion often drawn is that patients today are more willing to
sue their doctors and are more capable of doing so. Several reasons
for this trend have been suggested. The decline of the "family doctor"
practice and the movement toward specialization 12 has to a large extent
eliminated personal relationships between patients and doctors and
created a formal businesslike atmosphere; patients no longer feel
warmth and loyalty toward their doctors and are not hesitant to3 sue if
they believe that their treatment has been negligent or careless.'
It is also suggested that the conceptual expansion of certain legal
doctrines, such as informed consent,' 4 res ipsa loquitur,'5 the collateral
9. Cook, Doctors Want Action on Malpractice Crisis, Tallahassee Democrat, July
27, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 1.
10. The author's investigation into this subject began as a result of a staff
memorandum which she prepared while employed on the staff of the Health and
Rehabilitative Services Committee of the Florida House of Representatives. The memorandum analyzes the reasons for premium increases and describes and compares some
alternatives to the tort-liability system in the area of malpractice claims. Memorandum
to Dr. Richard S. Hodes, Chairman of Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services,
from Tom Herndon, Staff Director, October 3, 1974.
11. NEWSWEEK reports that 20,000 malpractice claims are being brought against
doctors each year and the number is rising steadily. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 59. Only
1.7 physicians out of every 100 were sued in 1966. This figure jumped to three out of
100 in 1972. Washington Report for State Legislatures, supra note 5, at 1. According
to a representative of the Florida Medical Association, 502 claims were filed against
Argonaut insurance policy holders in Florida in 1974 as compared to 208 claims in 1973.
American Medical News, supra note 7.
12. In 1971 more than four out of five physicians were specialists. G. ROFaECK,
DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1971).
13. HEW REPORT 67. See also Hager, Communication: A Therapeutic Tool (Argonaut Ins. Co., MAC Comment Bulletin No. 5, May 1974).
14. This doctrine is based on the theory that patients have a right to be informed
of the choices of treatment available for their medical problem and the dangers
potentially involved in each treatment. A patient's consent to treatment may not forestall the physician's liability if he or she is not adequately "informed" of these facts.
Lawsuits frequently arise in which the patient contends that had he been adequately informed of the risks involved, he would not have consented to the treatment. See general-
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source rule, 6 and the locality rule, 7 has broadened the scope of medical
malpractice liability. 8 It is said that the media tends to give special
attention to cases involving substantial amounts of money. Such publicity encourages others to litigate their claims, some of which are entirely
ly U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
TARY'S

COMMISSION

ON

EDUCATION AND WELFARE, APPENDIX TO REPORT OF THE SECRE-

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-REPORTS,

STUDIES, AND

ANALYSIS,

DHEW

PUBLICATION No. (OS)73-89, at 126 (1973) (hereinafter HEW APPENDIX); HEW REPORT
29. See also Mills, Whither Informed Consent? (Argonaut Ins. Co., MAC Law
Bulletin No. 9, Dec. 1974); Hassard, Informed Consent in Focus (Argonaut Ins. Co.,
MAC Comment Bulletin No. 12, Dec. 1974); 25 FLA. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons §
80 (1959).
15. "Res ipsa loquitur," which means "the thing speaks for itself," is a legal
doctrine which creates an inference of negligence. When the res ipsa loquitur theory is
allowed in a malpractice suit, it is not necessary for the patient to prove the doctor's
negligence by showing direct acts or omissions. Instead, if the plaintiff proves that the
event or injury is such as will not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, that
the person causing the harm was in exclusive control of the defendant, and that the
event or injury was not due to any contribution on the part of the plaintiff, his case may be
presented to the jury even though he produced no direct proof of negligence. HEW
APPENDIX 124. See also, HEW REPORT 28; Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1962); 23 FLA.
JUR. Negligence § 115, 116 (1959).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has not been applied in medical malpractice cases
in Florida when negligence is charged in diagnosis or treatment. Hine v. Fox, 89 So. 2d
13 (Fla. 1956); Roth v. Dade County, 71 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1954); West Coast Hosp. Ass'n.
v. Webb, 52 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1951); Grubbs v. McShane, 198 So. 208 (Fla. 1940); Foster
v. Thornton, 170 So. 459 (Fla. 1936).
16. The widely accepted collateral source rule provides that "benefits received
by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer
will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." 22 AM. JUE. 2d
Damages § 206 (1965). The result of this rule is that a plaintiff's income from such
sources as gratuitous medical care, salary, insurance proceeds, welfare, and pension
funds will not be made known to the jury and thus will not be considered when
damages are measured. Id. See also Annot., 18 A.L.R. 678 (1922). Collateral source rule
is recognized by Florida courts. See Burke v. Byrd, 188 F.Supp. 384 (N.D. Fla. 1960);
Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Finley P. Smith, Inc.
v. Schectman, 132 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
17. The "strict locality rule," once prevalent but now diminishing in importance
and usage, holds that a physician is required to treat his patients only in accordance
with accepted medical practices in his own community. In many jurisdictions this
rule has been modified. The standard of care under the modified rule is that "which is
ordinarily observed by other physicians and surgeons in good standing in either the
defendants' locality or a similar locality." 27 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts § 1, at 4-5 (1971).
The modified locality rule is followed in Florida. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d
575, 577 (Fla. 1957); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1958). But see Dillmann v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Potock
v.Turek, 227 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). Some courts have abandoned the
locality rule altogether. In these jurisdictions, the standard of care for judging the
physician's acts is whether he failed, under the circumstances of the case, "to exercise
the degree of skill and care that is usually exercised in similar cases by other members
of the medical profession generally, irrespective of the particular geographic localities
in which such other members of the profession, or the doctor himself, may practice."
27 AM. Jus. Proof of Facts § 1, at 4-5 (1971) (emphasis added).
18. Washington Report for State Legislatures, supra note 5, at 2.
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frivolous. 19 Finally, the contingency fee system 20 is often blamed for the
increase in the number of claims because it enables those who could
not otherwise afford to sue to do so. The increase in the number of
suits filed has been accompanied by an increase in the number 21 and
size 22 of awards received by plaintiffs.
Those who have analyzed the situation believe that this increase
is due to a variety of reasons. One of the most important of these is
the relative ease of obtaining medical witnesses to testify in the patient's
behalf.2 3 The stigma attached to testifying against a professional colleague is disappearing as doctors realize that it is advantageous to the
profession to refuse to protect "unfit" members. Moreover, the locality
rule,2 4 which requires that the doctor-defendant be judged by local
community standards is being limited by many jurisdictions, thus al25
lowing doctors from outside the community to testify.
A second factor influencing the frequency and size of jury awards
is that juries today are more willing to examine critically the medical
evidence presented and to set a higher standard of care than in the
past.2 6 It is also argued that highly skilled trial attorneys who are
capable of convincing juries to award high amounts are being attracted
27
to malpractice litigation because of the contingency fee system.
Those who argue that the greater numbers of claims filed and the
higher jury awards are the principal reasons for the malpractice situation often tend to overstate certain factors and to ignore others. For
19. HEW REPORT 18; HEW APPENDIX 653.
20. The contingency fee arrangement allows a client who could not afford to pay a
straight attorney fee to obtain legal counsel. An initial agreement is worked out between
the attorney and the client concerning the fee. If the case is lost, the attorney gets
nothing; if the attorney succeeds he or she receives a percentage, usually 30-40%, of
the award. This system is under severe attack by physicians who "are convinced that
the contingent fee system is the very root of today's malpractice problem." HEW REPORT
32. A St. Petersburg obstetrician is quoted as saying that "every time an attorney gets
a contingency fee he's stealing from the patient." Whitney, Doctors Say Lawyers Push
Suits, St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 22, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2.
21. Nationwide, the number of claims paid during 1969 was 6,606; by 1973 the number
had increased to 10,151. Florida Insurance Services Office, Data on Joint Underwriting Association, Florida Expense Provisions, exhibit 2, sheet 1 (1975).
22. During the calendar year ending June 30, 1969, the average paid claim
countrywide was $3,400. By December 31, 1973, the average cost had jumped to $5,407
per claim. Id. It is reported that in New York the average amount of a malpractice awardeither by judge or jury, or by out-of-court settlement-increased from $6,000 to $23,400

in 10 years.

NEWSWEEK,

June 9, 1974, at 59.

23. Rubsamen, supra note 3, at 30.
24. See note 17 supra.
25. For a thorough discussion of the "locality rule" see Note, An Evaluation of
Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729 (1970).
26. Rubsamen, supra note 3, at 30.
27. Id.
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instance, part of the increase in the number of claims filed against
doctors can be explained simply by the higher number of people seeking medical aid. Major health and medical plans, including Medicaid,
have made it possible for more people to obtain medical treatment.2 8 As
the number of doctor-patient contracts increases, so does the opportunity for medical incidents which give rise to malpractice claims.
Thus the increase in malpractice suits, to a certain extent at least, is
merely a function of an increased number of patients. The emphasis
on high jury awards is also worthy of closer scrutiny. As for the increased size of jury awards, one has only to look at the cost of living
index and recent inflationary trends to understand why a jury must
award more now than in the past to provide an injured person with
the same quantity and quality of medical care. The higher awards may
reflect only an effort to keep up with increasing medical service costs
and not a sudden generosity on the part of juries. Another factor
which is probably overrated as a cause of the malpractice crisis is the
number of very large awards that have been received by patients.
While it is true that a few patients have received extremely large
amounts, such awards are very infrequent.29 Although the increased
number of claims filed and amounts awarded are factors contributing
in part to the malpractice crisis, they are often overemphasized.
One overlooked factor involves ratesetting and actuarial issues. Insurance companies base their rates on actuarial predictions. By analyzing past statistical data and future trends, the actuary determines the
amount of premiums that must be charged in order to insure that
the company has sufficient funds to cover losses and administrative
costs, and to produce a margin of profit. The most accurate ratesetting
is accomplished when there is a large volume of data and a stable,
durable market. The malpractice insurance line certainly does not fit
this description. The total premium volume for physicians' and surgeons' malpractice insurance does not exceed 2.5 percent of the total
property-liability insurance premiums received by companies nationwide. 30 This small volume provides neither the adequate statistical
28. Shayne, Legal issues in Medical Malpractice (Argonaut Ins. Co., MAC Comment
Bulletin No. 1, Jan. 1975, at 2).
29. Before 1971 only three malpractice claims were settled for amounts in excess
of $1 million. Since 1971, about 15 settlements have exceeded $1 million. Washington
Report for State Legislatures, supra note 5. Slightly conflicting figures have been published
by Rubsamen. According to his article, until 1965 there was only one jury verdict in
the United States for medical malpractice which exceeded $1 million. But today approximately 30 awards of $1 million or more have been given by either jury verdicts or
out of court settlements. Rubsamen, supra note 3, at 30.
30. HEW APPENDIX 529. Due to the lack of readily available data in other areas,
these figures are limited to physicians and surgeons; however, many of the descriptions
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basis for complex actuarial techniques nor the incentive to spend time,
resources, and money to improve the methods used. As a result, actuarial
techniques are simpler and predictions less accurate than for other
types of insurance.3 1 Another aspect of this size disadvantage is that
the affects of a loss are more severe. As David S. Rubsamen explains:
It is worthwhile recalling the purely arithmetic factor that contributes to high malpractice insurance premiums. The underlying
philosophy of insurance is to share the risk. Among automobile
carriers, the prospect of severe loss creates no special problem, because the necessary increase in premiums is spread among hundreds
of thousands of a company's insureds. For the malpractice company,
on the other hand, a bad claims experience among its few thousand
physician-insureds must result in a large premium jump for each
3 2
doctor.
Besides its size disadvantage, the malpractice insurance field is
plagued by another unique and troublesome characteristic-the "long
tail" phenomenon. The "long tail" refers to the extended period of
time occurring between the opening and closing of a medical malpractice claim. On the average, 10 percent of all malpractice claims remain unsettled 6
years after the occurrence of an injury.3 3 In contrast, nearly 100 percent of all automobile claims are settled within 3
years of the accident. 34 The average time from the onset of a medical
injury to a final decision on the case is 40 months where there is a
settlement, and 60 months where a trial is necessary.35
Insurers complain that a major reason for the "long tail" is the discovery rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the injury is discovered .36 Data is available, however,
which indicates that most injuries are recognized within 1 year of
occurrence. 37 Insurers also dislike the rule followed in some jurisdictions which tolls the statute of limitations for minors until they attain

and conclusions apply to hospitals, dentists, etc. Id.
31. Id.
32. Rubsamen, supra note 3, at 34.
33. HEW REPORT 42.
34. Id.
35. HEW APPENDIX 258.
36. According to this rule the statute of limitations "does not begin to run until
the patient knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that a
negligent act occurred." HEW REPORT 30. The statute of limitations provision of the
Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 is discussed in section IIA1 of this note.
37.

HEW APPENDIX 254.
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majority38 This situation also occurs very infrequently and certainly

is not a major reason for the "long tail." Rather, the prolonged closing
time for malpractice suits lies mainly in two other areas of the resolution process-the time from the recognition of the injury to filing of
the suit, and the time from the filing of the suit to the final formal hearing. 39 Among the factors cited for causing these delays are court congestion, the long time period necessary for the attorneys to prepare
their cases, and a natural tendency to delay, combined, at times, with
0
the strategic nature of delay.4
Probably the most significant cause of malpractice insurance problems is the effect of the current economic conditions on insurance
companies. Insurers are generally required by state statutes to maintain
a certain amount of surplus capital to cover any catastrophic losses. The
companies often invest this surplus in common stocks. During the past
two years many companies over-invested, and as a result of the market
decline, a number of them suffered reductions of surplus in excess of
50 percent.4'1 When surplus reduction occurs, companies must reduce
their premium volume; naturally the least stable lines of insurance,
such as medical malpractice, are dropped. This is precisely what has
occurred in Florida.4'2 The limited availability of underwriters reduces
competition and allows the insurers who continue to offer coverage
to, in effect, name their own price. Thus a major factor in the malpractice insurance crisis involves current economic conditions and
open-market competition.
It is apparent that those seeking a solution to the malpractice situation are faced with a number of complex and interrelated issues.
There is no simple explanation for the situation, nor is there a simple
method of resolving the problems.
III.

THE FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO THE

MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE CRISIS

The demand for remedial legislation to alleviate Florida's malpractice crisis began early in 1975 when an intensive lobbying effort was
staged by the Florida Medical Association, local medical societies, and
38. In Florida the limitation period for an action of negligence on behalf of an
infant is not tolled by reason of infancy. 21 FLA. JUt. Limitations of Actions § 55 (Supp.

1976); Gasparro v. Homer, 245 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
39. HEW APPENDIX 256.
40. Id. at 254.
41. Rubsamen, supra note 3, at 34.
42. Whitney, Malpractice Suits Viewed as Threat to Health Care, St. Petersburg
Times, Jan. 6, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 3.
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individual physicians. Physicians and others in the health care field
came from all over the state to testify before various legislative committees that were analyzing the problem. 41 Their combined efforts culminated in the passage by the legislature of a comprehensive and far
reaching law, the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975.
The Act contains 17 sections, 12 of which may be termed operational sections. The 12 operational sections can be divided into four categories-alteration of legal doctrines, procedural changes, insurance related changes, and measures designed to reduce medical malpractice
incidents. Sections which affect legal doctrines include a provision
which shortens the statute of limitations for malpractice claims,' 4 a
statute of frauds provision which bars suits based on guarantees, warranties, or assurances made by health care providers unless the agreement is in writing,45 and a provision creating the Florida medical consent law.4 6 Procedural changes include authorization for the creation
of medical liability mediation panels4 7 and the requirement that the
amount of general damages be omitted from complaints filed in circuit
court for personal injury or wrongful death. 48 The insurance related
provisions include creation of the Florida Medical Liability Insurance
Commission,' 9 authorization for groups or associations of medical
doctors or health-care facilities to self-insure,5 0 directions for the Department of Insurance to adopt a temporary joint underwriting plan
in which certain casualty insurers and self-insurers are required to participate,5 1 and establishment of a patient's compensation fund to pay
specified malpractice claims in excess of $100,000. 5 2 The provisions designed to reduce malpractice incidents include the requirements that

43. Meetings of the Commerce Committee of the Florida House of Representatives
held during April 1975 attracted medical insurance personnel who spoke to the
Committee about the malpractice situation.
44. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 7 (§ 95.11(4)).
45.
46.

Id. § 10 (§ 725.01).
Id. § 11 (§ 768.132).

47. Id. § 5 (§ 768.133).
48. Id. § 8 (§ 768.042).
49. Id. § 2 (§ 627.352). The Commission is charged with the preparation of a
report and recommendations to the Governor and legislature containing a plan which
sets forth a "medical liability insurance system which can be operated at reasonable cost
for the purpose of providing prompt, equitable compensation to those sustaining
medical injury." § 627.352(5)(a). [Editor's Note: § 627.352 was not published in the 1975
statutes because of the reviser's decision that it is not a law of general applicability.] The
report was delivered to the Governor and legislature in early January 1976. Florida Medical
Liability Ins. Comm'n, Report to the Governor and the Florida Legislature (Jan. 1976).
50. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 4 (627.355).
51. Id. § 14 (§ 627.351(8)).
52.

Id. § 15 (§ 627.353).
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hospitals establish internal risk management programs5 3 and that the
Florida Board of Medical Examiners and the medical staffs of licensed
54
hospitals be given increased disciplinary powers.
Regardless of whether this new Act will operate to reduce medical
malpractice problems in Florida, it is certain that it will significantly
affect the patient's ability to sue the health care provider. Provisions of
the Act which are sure to impact on the injured patient's ability to
have his or her day in court, as well as those concepts introduced by
the Act to assure the continued availability of malpractice insurance,
54
are discussed in the following sections. a
A.

Alteration of Legal Doctrines

1. The Statute of Limitations.-A statute of limitations prescribes a
period beyond which an action at law or suit in equity cannot be maintained.55 Time limitations which are reasonable56 and "afford full opportunity to sue before the bar takes effect ' ' 57 are widely accepted as
valid and necessary to
encourage promptness in instituting actions; to suppress stale demands or fraudulent claims; and to avoid inconvenience which may
result from delay in asserting rights or claims when it is practicable
to assert them. 58

Statutes of limitations vary in length and are most often measured
from the time the "right to bring the same [action] shall have accrued"59 or from "the time the incident occurred giving rise to the
action."60 Using this measurement, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action begins to run on the day the injury occurred.
Though the logic of this measure is apparent, its strict application to
53. Id. § 3 (§ 395.18).
54. Id. §§ 12, 13 (§§ 458.1201, 395.065).
54a. [Editor's Note: This note was set in print before the 1975 Florida Statutes
were published. References in text and footnotes to specific sections are to the sections of the 1973 statutes which the legislature amended in the 1975 session. Because of
editorial revisions by the Statutory Revision and Indexing Division of the Joint Legislative Management Committee, many section numbers have been changed, and editorial
alterations made to text. Specific instances where the reviser's changes affect the substance of the text are noted.]
55. 51 AM. JuR. 2d Limitations of Actions § 2 (1970); 21 FLA. JUR. Limitations of Actions § 2 (1958).
56. Skinner v. City of Eustis, 2 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1941).
57. 51 Am. Jin. 2d Limitations of Actions § 31 (1970).
58. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1965).
59. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (Supp. 1959), amending W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1931).
60. Fla. Laws 1975, Ch. 75-9, § 7 (§ 95.11(4)(b)).
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medical malpractice situations sometimes causes harsh and unjust results. Occasionally the patient will not know immediately that an act
of medical negligence has occurred. This often happens when a doctor
unwittingly leaves a foreign object inside the patient during an operation and the object is not discovered until several years later.61 In
cases such as this the patient is often totally and justifiably ignorant
of the injury. Yet strict enforcement of the rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run at the moment the foreign object is left
in the body may operate to deny the patient who does not promptly
discover the injury any right to redress within the court system. By
the time the patient discovers the injury the statute of limitations may
have run. A majority of jurisdictions in the past adhered to the interpretation that the statute of limitations for malpractice actions begins to
run when the incident occurs, regardless of when the patient discovered,
or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. 62 Some courts, sensing
the injustice of denying a person who was justifiably ignorant of his
injury the right to a remedy, began to interpret the time the cause of
action accrues in foreign object cases as the time when the patient
discovers, or should have discovered, the foreign substance.6 3 A landmark case in this area was Urie v. Thompson,6 4 in which the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a suit brought within 3 years from
the time an employee discovered his occupational disease was not
barred by a 3-year statute of limitations even though the claim was
filed more than 3 years after the patient contracted the disease.
The court opined:
If Urie were held barred from prosecuting this action because he
must be said, as a matter of law, to have contracted silicosis prior
to November 25, 1938, it would be clear that the federal legislation
afforded Urie only a delusive remedy. It would mean that at some
past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even
in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and
tragic disintegration of his lungs; under this view Urie's failure to
diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease whose
61. See generally Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209, 231 (1943); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368,
386 (1961).
62. See, e.g., Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940); Hudson v. Moore,
194 So. 147 (Ala. 1940); Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 174 S.E. 365 (Ga. 1934); Maloney v.
Brackett, 176 N.E. 604 (Mass. 1931); Cappuci v. Barone, 165 N.E. 653 (Mass. 1919);
Bernath v. Le Fever, 189 A. 342 (Pa. 1937).
63. Huysman v. Kirsch, 57 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1936); Ehlen v. Burrows, 124 P.2d 82 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1942); Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 130 P.2d 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); Perrin v.
Rodriguez, 153 So. 55 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
64. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute
waiver of his right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability.
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such
consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those
consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of
claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion
of legal rights ....65
The Urie decision unequivocally incorporated the discovery rule into
federal law and extended its application to medical malpractice incidents not involving a foreign object left in the body. Many state courts
followed this lead and overruled earlier decisions which held that the
statute of limitations for malpractice incidents began to run when the
injury occurred. 66 Florida joined this group in 1954 when the supreme
court declared that "the statute attaches when there has been notice of
an invasion of the legal right of the plaintiff or he has been put on
' ' 67
notice of his right to a cause of action.
Although for over 20 years the Florida courts have faithfully followed the discovery rule, not until 1971 did the Florida legislature
create a statute of limitations applying specifically to medical malpractice.68 Prior to this enactment the limitation period for such malpractice actions depended on whether the suit sounded in contract,
for which the limitation period was 3 years, 69 or tort, in which
case the time limit was 4 years.7 0 The 1971 law provided a 2year statute of limitations on actions "to recover damages for injuries
to the person arising from any medical, dental ... treatment or surgical
operation,"' 7 1 and adopted the judicially created "discovery rule" by
providing that "the cause of action in such cases [is] not ...deemed
to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers, or through use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury. "72
65. Id. at 169-70.
66. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224 (Idaho 1964); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh,
215 A.2d 825 (Md. 1966); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966);
Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961); Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 99 (Ore. 1966);
Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156
(W. Va. Ct. App. 1965).
67. City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954).
68. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-254 (§ 95.11(6)).
69. Manning v. Serrano, 97 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1957).
70. Id.
71. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-254 (§ 95.11(6)).
72. Id.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

62

[Vol. 4:50

In 1974 the law was further amended to create a 2-year statute of
limitations period regardless of whether the professional malpractice
action was founded on contract or tort theory, and the "discovery rule,"
absent any restricting provisions, was again incorporated into the
73
statute.
The 1975 legislature, obviously persuaded by the medical profession's argument that the discovery rule is a significant factor contributing to the malpractice crisis, restricted the rule by enacting legislation
which limits the ability of a patient to sue on a bona fide malpractice
claim. The statute provides:
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within
two years from the time the incident occurred giving rise to the
action, or within two years from the time the incident is discovered,
or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence,
provided, however, that in no event shall the action be commenced
later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence
out of which the cause of action accrued .... In those actions covered
by this paragraph where it can be shown that fraud, concealment,
or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of
the injury within the four-year period, the period of limitations
is extended forward two years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence, but in no event to exceed seven years from the date the
74
incident giving rise to the injury occurred.
The statute retains the 2-year limitations period and the discovery rule, but it limits the use of the discovery rule to a 4-year
period measured from the time of the incident upon which the claim
is based. Where fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation
by the medical care provider has occurred, the discovery period is extended to 7 years. The result of this provision is that absolutely all
malpractice claims are prohibited after 7 years from the date of the
incident on which the claim is based, even where the resulting injury
could not be discovered because of fraudulent misrepresentations by
the doctor.
Three arguments can be made in support of the proposition that
these restrictions should be repealed. First, it is undeniable that the
statute may work an injustice on one who, through no fault of his
own, fails to discover that he has suffered a medical injury until 4
years after the incident which gave rise to the claim has passed. Con73.
74.

Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-382 § 7 (§ 95.11(4)(a)).
Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 7 (§ 95.11(4)(b)).
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sider the following hypothetical situation. A patient undergoes a major
operation which is performed by Doctor A on June 1, 1975. During the
surgery the doctor negligently leaves a sponge in the patient's body.
The patient recovers from the surgery but continues to suffer discomfort and pain in the area of the wound. The doctor assures the patient
that the pain is to be expected following major surgery and that recovery has been normal. Doctor A is unaware of his mistake and he
continues to treat the patient for the pain. The patient, not being
medically educated and having no way of knowing what the problem
is, trusts his doctor's diagnosis and believes that the pain is an unavoidable result of the operation. In July 1979 the patient moves to
another city where he contacts Doctor B. After taking X-rays of the
area where the surgery was performed, Doctor B informs the patient
that the pain is caused by the sponge which Doctor A left in the wound.
The patient must undergo another costly operation to have the sponge
removed. Under the 1975 amendment the patient would have absolutely no judicial remedy in the Florida courts because more than 4
years would have elapsed since the surgery was performed. The questions posed by a West Virginia court75 demonstrate equally well the
inequity of the hypothetical situation. The court queried:
Can anybody reasonably assert that she [the patient] was guilty of
lack of diligence when the evidence of the alleged wrong or tort
committed by the surgeon was effectively sealed and hidden from
view . . .? Must she be penalized and denied a day in court and
must the defendants . . .be rendered immune from any redress of

the wrong inflicted merely because apparently the wrong could be discovered only by means of an X-ray...?76
The statute limiting the period for discovery to no more than 4
years, or in cases of fraud to 7 years, is almost as unrealistic as a
strict limitation period which provides no discovery rule at all. A limitation period which does not run from the time the injury is or should
have been discovered "places a burden upon the wronged plaintiff
[to discover the injury before the action is time-barred] which he or
she would rarely, if ever, be able to carry."7 The following language
from Judge Holtzoff's well reasoned opinion in Burke v. Washington
Hospital Center78 is apropos:

75.
76.
77.
78.

Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1965).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 159.
293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968).
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To confer a cause of action for damages on the one hand and on the
other to let it be oozed away by lapse of time when the patient could
not possibly know of the existence of his rights, would be to take
away with the left hand what has been given with the right. It
would be keeping the word of promise to the ear and breaking it
79
to the hope.
For the sake of reason and justice the legislature should abandon the
restrictions on the discovery rule.
The second reason for repealing the new provision is that it
probably will not significantly improve the medical malpractice situation. An empirical study has indicated that nearly all malpractice injuries are discovered within 1 year. 0 It seems unlikely that a few
isolated incidents of delayed discovery could cause the "long-tail"
phenomenon.8 ' The HEW study suggests that it is delays other than
the incident-to-injury recognition period which cause the total time
from incident-to-settlement to be uncommonly long for malpractice
82
cases.
The legislature should carefully weigh the benefits to be derived
from restricting the discovery rule against the injustices which will be
suffered by individuals who are denied their right to redress as a result of the new statute of limitations. This author suggests that little
if any improvement in malpractice insurance availability will accrue
as a result of this restriction. Likewise the limitation will do little to
stabilize the insurance market or reduce malpractice insurance
premiums. It will, however, gravely injure those few individuals who
are denied a legal remedy because they were unable, through no fault
of their own, to discover the injury within 4 years, or even worse,
were not able to pierce within 7 years a doctor's web of deceit and
misrepresentation concerning a concealed injury. If the legislature
would balance the benefits to be derived against the injustices which
will be suffered, it might well conclude that the law should be repealed.
A third reason for repealing the new statute of limitations is that
the statute may violate the Florida constitution. The proposition that
' 83
for every wrong there is a remedy is a "bedrock principle of law. "
The Declaration of Rights of the 1885 constitution incorporated this
idea as does article I, section 21 of the present constitution: "The

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1334.
See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay."8
It has been suggested by at least one judge that to interpret a
statute of limitations in such a way that the time runs from the time
of the injury regardless of when the injury is discovered, might be a
85
violation of the citizens' guaranteed right of access to the courts.
After alluding to a provision in the West Virginia constitution
guaranteeing that "every man for an injury done him .. .shall have

remedy by due course of law,"'8 6 Justice McBride, in a concurring
opinion in Ayers v. Morgan,8 7 stated:
They [statutes of limitations] are desirable in that they prevent
oppression by forbidding plaintiffs to litigate state claims and thus
compel defense at a time when such defense is no longer practicable
and sometimes even impossible. Nevertheless, the restrictionsimposed
may not be so arbitrary as to preclude a reasonable opportunity for
one who has been harmed to make his claim.88

When an injured party is statutorily denied his remedy before he can
reasonably ascertain that an injury has in fact occurred, the obvious
inquiry should be whether the party has been denied his constitutional
right to redress.
In Stewart v. Gilliam,0 the argument was made that if courts allowed

recovery for psychic injuries without impact a "flood tide of litigation" would ensue. 90 The Supreme Court of Florida, after pointing out
the constitutional requirement that every person have access to the
courts, stated:
It is far more consistent with justice to be concerned with the availability of a judicial forum for the adjudication of individual rights
than to deny access of our courts because of speculation of an increased burden.9 1
The legislature would do well to realize that it is also more consistent
with justice to be concerned with the availability of a forum for the
adjudication of individual rights than to deny access to our courts
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959) (concurring opinion).
PA. CONST. art I, § 11 (1874, as amended 1969).
154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959).
Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added).
271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 475.
Id.
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because of speculation that restricted access might decrease the cost
of medical malpractice insurance.
2. Statute of Frauds.-Section10 of the Act amends Florida's Statute
of Frauds92 to provide:
No action shall be brought ... whereby to charge any health care
provider upon any guarantee, warranty or assurance as to the results
of any medical, surgical, or diagnostic procedure, performed by any
physician . . . osteopath . . . chiropractor . . . podiatrist , . . or
dentist ... unless the agreement or promise upon which such action
shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be
in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by
93
some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized.
Prior to this amendment Florida courts followed the majority of
jurisdictions in recognizing the right of a plaintiff-patient to bring an
action against a doctor for breach of a contract to obtain a specific
result or cure if the contract was express and was supported by consideration.9 4 There has never been a judicially imposed requirement
that the contract be in writing; in the malpractice cases based on a
breach of guarantee or warranty, oral statements have been deemed to
constitute a contract.9" For the plaintiff to maintain an action on a contract under the new amendment, the contract must be in writing and
signed by the medical care provider.
A survey of the reported malpractice cases in this state indicated
that while both the contract and the tort theories have been available
to a plaintiff, 96 patients and courts alike have most frequently used the
tort theory. 97 An element of negligence is involved in most malpractice
92. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1975).
93. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 10 (§ 725.01).
94. Florida malpractice cases in which the courts have determined a breach of
contract action to be appropriate include Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263
So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Fradley v. County of
Dade, 187 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). "A physician or surgeon is not, however,
a guarantor of the correctness of his diagnosis or of a cure and will not be held liable
where he has employed reasonable skill and care in determining the diagnosis and has
administered proper treatment without negligence, even though the desired results do
not ensue." Atkins v. Humes, 107 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 110 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1959).
95. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Vilord v.
Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
96. See, e.g., Fradley v. County of Dade, 187 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
97. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1225 (1972).

1976]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT

actions; thus even if the contract theory is unavailable, a plaintiff will
usually have an alternative action in tort. For this reason the requirement that contracts be in writing probably will not bar many malpractice suits; its main effect will be to limit the choice of theories
upon which an action may be brought to that of negligence. 9
Supporters of the amendment argue that written contracts are
necessary to protect medical care providers from vengeful patients who
are not satisfied with the results of the treatment that they received,
and who interpret a mere therapeutic reassurance as a guarantee or
warranty that the procedure will be effective.9 9 The paucity of Florida
cases decided in favor of the plaintiff on the contract theory indicates
that the courts are aware of the potential for misinterpretation of
the doctor's words and that the use of the theory has been restricted
so as to avoid this problem.
It seems that in view of the court's restraint on the use of this
theory, the Statute of Frauds provision is unnecessary. The legislation
is similar to most of the other provisions in the Act in that it further
limits the patient's choice of actions against a doctor. But because the
negligence theory is almost always available as an alternative to the
contract theory, hopefully the limitation created here will not significantly restrict the patient's ability to get into court.
3. The Florida Medical Consent Law.-Few legal theories in the
medical malpractice area have been so thoroughly and intensely debated as the doctrine of "informed consent."1 ° Because the 1975
legislature significantly altered the doctrineo1 as it had been developed
by judicial decisions, an analysis of the changes made in the doctrine
and a prediction of the effects they will have on the injured patient's
ability to maintain a medical malpractice suit is appropriate.
98. But see Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In this
case a patient brought an action against Dr. Cohen on the ground of alleged negligence
on the part of the physician because the patient's wife became pregnant after the doctor
performed a vasectomy on the patient. The court held that the physician was not
liable because a physician is not an insurer of the success of his treatment. The
court suggested that had the pleading alleged that the doctor had orally guaranteed the
success of the operation the outcome might have been different.
99. Information sheet prepared by the Florida Medical Association, April, 1975; see
also Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1972).
100. For an exhaustive list of articles dealing with the "informed consent" doctrine,
see Comment, Informed Consent after Cobbs-Has the Patient Been Forgotten?, 10 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 913, 915 n.10 (1973). See also Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974); Comment, New Trends
in Informed Consent?, 54 NEB. L. REv. 66 (1975); Comment, Informed Consent: Alternatives for Illinois, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 739; Comment, Physicians and Surgeons-Standards
of Care-Medical Specialist May Be Found Negligent as a Matter of Law Despite
Compliance with the Customary Practice of the Specialty, 28 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1975).
101. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 11 (§ 768.132).
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The objective of the "informed consent" doctrine is simple and
logical. A doctor may not lawfully treat a patient unless that patient
gives his consent to the proposed treatment. 1 2 If consent is not obtained, the treatment is unauthorized and the doctor may be liable for
assault and battery or an action in trespass.103 Obviously a knowledgeable and intelligent choice of whether to consent to a certain treatment or procedure is impossible unless the patient is advised of the
procedure or treatment to be followed, the risks involved in the treatment or procedure, and the alternatives which are available. The consent which results from a decision based on a thorough explanation
of these facts is termed an "informed consent." Informed consent is
necessary to preserve the patient's right to choose what happens to his
body. Recognizing this right of self-determination, courts generally
have held that a patient's consent to a proposed course of treatment
is valid only to the extent that the patient gives consent after being
0
sufficiently informed of the nature, risks, and alternatives available. 4
Florida courts have long adhered to the rule that consent is a prerequisite to medical treatment'"° and in 1963 added the requirement
that the consent be an informed one. 10 6
The informed consent theory, clear-cut as it seems, raises an immediate question: What standard is to be used to determine whether
102. The principle was best expressed by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914):
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages. . . . This is true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is
unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.
See also Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1944);
Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187, 192 (W.D. La. 1955), afJ'd, 234 F.2d 811 (5th
Cir. 1956); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960), clarified, 354 P.2d 670
(Kan. 1960); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14-15 (Minn. 1905); W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 18 (4th ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 49 (1934).
103. Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1955); Wall v. Brim, 183
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 57 (1944); Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d
125 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 718-19 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Mims v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Annot., 56
A.L.R.2d 695, 697-99 (1957); 61 Am JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §
155 (1972).
104. See Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1970); Dunham v.
Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 943-46 (3d Cir. 1970); Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (N.M.
1962); Mason v. Ellsworth, 474 P.2d 909, 918-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
105. 25 FLA. JuR. Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1959).
106. In Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963), the
court stated: "Unless a person who gives consent to an operation knows its dangers and the
degree of danger, a "consent" does not represent a choice and is ineffectual."
Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), is a later case recognizing
the necessity of obtaining an informed consent.

1976]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT

adequate disclosure has been made and who is to set that standard?
The majority of courts have attempted to resolve this question by
10 7
Under
adopting the "reasonable medical practitioner" standard.
this standard the adequacy of the doctor's disclosure to the patient is
measured by what "a reasonable medical practitioner" in "the same
or a similar community ' '1 8 would disclose to his patient about the
proposed treatment. To establish this standard most jurisdictions require that the plaintiff produce expert testimony to prove the extent of
the defendant-doctor's duty to disclose. 09 In these jurisdictions the
case can proceed to the jury only if the plaintiff can show, through
the testimony of a medical expert, that the defendant's disclosure fell
short of that disclosure which a reasonable medical practitioner in the
same or a similar community would have made.
Critics of the "reasonable medical practitioner" standard have attacked it for several valid reasons. 1 0 One criticism is that it is often
extremely difficult for a patient to convince a doctor to testify against
his fellow professionals."' The patient is therefore unable to supply the
expert witness necessary to establish the standard of disclosure for the
community." 2 Also, in reality there is often no discernible community
custom;" a rather the testimony is merely another doctor's personal
opinion of what he would have done in the situation.- Perhaps the
most serious effect of the "reasonable medical practitioner" standard
is that it allows the medical profession to set its own standards of disclosure. Perhaps this is necessary in ordinary malpractice suits, but it
107. Di Filippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (Del. 1961); Williams v. Menehan,
379 P.2d 292, 294 (Kan. 1963); Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Mich. 1963);
Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762, 766 (N.C. 1955); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299,
301 (Tex. 1967); Anderson v. Hooker, 420 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Govin
v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Wyo. 1962).
108. See notes 17 and 25 supra. Florida cases on this subject include Bourgeois v.
Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Dillmann v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Brooks v. Serrano, 209 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Bir v. Foster, 123 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App 1960).
109. An extensive list of cases which require the use of expert testimony may be
found in Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396,
1397 n.5 (1967). See also Visingardi v. Tirone, 178 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1965) rev'd, 193 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1967), vacated, 194 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
110. The most frequent criticisms are explained in Note, Informed Consent-a Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 548, 551-55 (1973).
111. Id. at 552; Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REV.
834, 835-37 (1966).
112. See, e.g., Petterson v. Lynch, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1969).
113. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
114. Id. at 784.
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is not necessary in informed consent litigation. 115 Several courts have
recognized these objections to be valid and therefore have rejected the
"reasonable medical practitioner" standard as the standard by which
the doctor's duty to disclose is measured. 116 Instead these jurisdictions have held that to obtain a valid consent, the doctor must supply
17
the patient with all information material to the consent decision.
In jurisdictions adhering to this standard, expert testimony to show
what the reasonable medical practitioner would do is not essential. Instead, the standard is whether the disclosure contains all the elements
which a reasonable patient would have considered material to a decision to consent to the treatment. It is up to the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant-doctor failed to disclose information which a
"reasonable patient"" 8 would consider material to his consent decision. Although the recently developed minority view is preferable
from the patient's vantage point, the Florida courts have yet to consider it. To date, Florida courts have retained the "reasonable medical
practitioner" standard." 9
One might conclude from the paucity of reported informed consent cases in Florida that this legal doctrine is not often used and
thus could not be a significant factor in the medical malpractice insurance area. Evidently the Florida Legislature did not reach this
conclusion, for the Florida Medical Consent Law"120 is a sweeping
attempt to restrict the use of the informed consent doctrine in medical
malpractice actions. The law provides:
(3) No recovery shall be allowed in any court in this state against any
physician . . . osteopath . . .chiropractor . . . podiatrist . . . or
dentist .. .in an action brought for treating, examining, or operating on a patient without his informed consent where:
(a) The action of the physician, osteopath, chiropractor,
podiatrist, or dentist in obtaining the consent of the patient . . .
was in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice
115. Id. at 784-85.
116. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I.
1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
117. Berkley v.Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647,
650 (Pa. 1971).
118. See Comment, Cooper v. Roberts: A "Reasonable Patient" Test for Informed
Consent, 34 U. PIrr. L. REV. 500, 501 (1973).
119. See Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) in
which the court recognized the uniform principle that "the standard to be applied is
whether, according to expert testimony, a reasonable medical practitioner in the community would make such a disclosure under the same or similar circumstances."
120. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 11 (§ 768.132).
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among members of the medical profession with similar training and
experience in the same or similar medical community; and
(b) A reasonable individual from the information provided by
the physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or dentist under
the circumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedure and medically acceptable alternative procedures or treatments
and substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed treatment or procedures which are recognized among other physicians,
osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists, or dentists in the same or
similar community who perform similar treatments or procedures;
or
(c) The patient would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances, have undergone such treatment or procedure had he
been advised by the physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist,
or dentist in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and
1 21
(b) of this section.
The law attempts to describe certain situations in which the informed consent theory cannot be used by a patient in an action for
malpractice. If the circumstances set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
occur, recovery on the grounds of lack of an informed consent is
barred. Subparagraph (c) describes another distinct situation, apparently independent of subparagraphs (a) and (b), where recovery is prohibited. First consider subparagraphs (a) and (b). The patient, according to these subparagraphs, may not recover for medical malpractice
based on the informed consent theory if the doctor's disclosure met
the community standard for disclosures 122 and if a reasonable individual, after hearing the disclosure, would have a "general understanding" of the procedures, alternatives, risks and hazards involved
in the treatment.1 23 Because the "reasonable individual" test of subparagraph (b) is included, the law goes one step further than the
court-instituted rule. Prior to this enactment, if the doctor could convince the trier-of-fact that the disclosures he made were comparable to
the disclosures most other doctors in the same or a similar community
would make, no liability would be imposed even though the patient
might not have been given facts sufficient to enable him to understand the risks and procedures involved. In this respect subparagraphs
(a) and (b) of the new law are a slight improvement over the judicial
rule: not only must the disclosure meet the community standard, but
it must also be a disclosure which would give a "reasonable individual"
121,
122.
123.

Id. (§ 768.132(3)).
Id. (§ 768.132(3)(a)).
Id. (§ 768.132(3)(b)).
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a "general understanding" of the procedures involved. One could surmise, therefore, that if the doctor complies with the community
standard, but the community standard is not sufficiently detailed for
a reasonable individual to understand the nature of the treatment,
then "informed consent" has not been obtained and legal basis for a
suit exists.
In summary, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the new Florida Consent Law codify the judicially-created "reasonable medical practitioner" standard for disclosure in malpractice suits which are based on the
informed consent theory and add the proviso that the disclosure be
one which would give a "reasonable individual" a "general understanding" of the risks and procedures involved.
Subparagraph (c), however, adds an entirely new and thoroughly
obnoxious restriction on individuals attempting to base litigation on
the informed consent theory. This portion of the law says, in effect,
that no recovery will be allowed under the "informed consent" theory
if the defendant can convince the trier-of-fact that even though he
neither obtained a valid consent nor made any disclosure, if he had
made proper disclosures, the patient, being a reasonable person, would
have agreed to the procedure. The incredible implication of this section is that even though no disclosure whatsoever has been made, and
no consent whatsoever has been obtained, the patient may still be
prohibited from recovering under the "informed consent" doctrine.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: A patient consents to a
back operation for the removal of a disc, and during the surgery the
doctor notices a theretofore unknown spinal injury. Although no
emergency exists, the doctor on his own initiative and without authorization surgically repairs the spinal injury. The procedure is known to
carry a 5 percent risk of paralysis. The patient, as a result of the
procedure, is paralyzed and brings a malpractice suit against the doctor,
alleging that he performed a surgical procedure without obtaining her
consent or informing her of the risks involved. The patient shows in
court by uncontroverted evidence that no consent, informed or otherwise, was obtained prior to the operation. She also presents a medical
expert who testifies that the spinal injury, if not corrected, would have
been a source of occasional pain but would not have resulted in further
injury or death. The patient testifies that had her consent been sought
and had she been informed of the risks, she would not have agreed to
the surgery. The doctor's argument is that the patient is precluded
from recovering under the Act. His contention is that although he
performed the procedure without disclosing the risks or obtaining
consent, if he had made adequate disclosures for the purpose of
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obtaining consent, and if his disclosure would have given a general
understanding of the risks involved, the patient would reasonably
have consented to the additional surgery. If the doctor can convince
the trier-of-fact that his contention is correct, recovery is barred. Thus
an injured patient on whom a dangerous surgical procedure was performed without consent would be without a remedy.
It seems unlikely that the legislature intended this result. The
principle that a doctor must obtain consent from a patient before
treating or operating, unless the patient is incapable of consenting or
an emergency exists, is a well-settled rule in every jurisdiction.124 To
take away the necessity of obtaining consent is to deny a patient the
right to determine what happens to his or her body. Yet the language
in subparagraph (c) implies that recovery will be denied upon a
showing that the patient would have consented if consent had been
sought after proper disclosure of the risks. This result is intolerable.
The language in subparagraph (c) is sufficiently vague to be interpreted in another way. The subparagraph could be read to apply in
situations where consent has been obtained but disclosure prior to
obtaining the consent was not adequate to inform the patient of the
risks involved. 12 5 In such a situation, the patient is nevertheless precluded from recovering because of the inadequate disclosure if the
doctor can prove that the patient would have consented even if he had
been adequately informed of the risks involved. In other words, even
though a consent without adequate disclosure was obtained, the patient
would have consented regardless of any risks the doctor might have
disclosed and thus the doctor is not liable for an injury which the
patient was willing to risk.
Persons involved in drafting subparagraph

(c) 12 6 indicated that

the section was intended to cover emergencies and situations where the
124. See note 100 supra.
125. This interpretation could be achieved by reading the section as mandating
that the doctor initially satisfy subparagraph (a). He would then have to satisfy either
subsection (b) or (c) before he would have a valid defense. However, this construction
is negated somewhat by the language of subsection (c) which appears to state that this
subsection applies only where the doctor has failed to comply with the standards
set forth in both subsection (a) and (b). The specific language which supports the
interpretation that subsection (c) applies exclusive of subsections (a) and (b) is found
at Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 11, (768.132(3)(c)) and reads as follows: "The patient
would reasonably . . . have undergone such treatment or procedure had he been
advised by the physician . . . in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section." (emphasis added). [Editors Note: As printed in the 1976 FLA. STAT.,
subsections (a) and (b) were combined into one subsection, thereby requiring the interpretation proposed by the author.]
126. Conversation with member of the staff of the Commerce Committee of the
Florida House of Representatives (Sept. 1975).
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patient is physically or mentally incapable of understanding a disclosure
and giving a valid consent. Thus if a patient requiring immediate surgery is brought into the hospital in an unconscious state and with no
relatives or acquaintances accompanying him, this section would protect the doctor from a suit based on the "informed consent" theory. If
this is the result intended, one wonders why the drafters did not use
explicit language referring to emergency and similar situations. The
fact that at least three reasonable interpretations of the section are
possible suggests that the provisions should be clarified. The informed
consent provision should be rewritten to protect the patient's right of
self-determination by defining the scope of the doctor's duty to disclose.
Several methods have been proposed to accomplish these objectives.
These suggestions generally have been based on principles set forth in
cases adopting the minority view concerning disclosure standards.127
The consensus is that the "reasonable medical practitioner" standard
should be rejected. The better standard from the patient's standpoint
is disclosure of all "facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment." 128 At
least one commentator' 29 however, believes that an informed consent
standard should go even further and enumerate substantive topics
which must be discussed with the patient. The author suggests that
the required topics should include:
[T]he methods and means by which the treatment is to be administered; the risks and hazards involved, including temporary and permanent after- and side-effects; any alternative forms of therapy; expected beneficial effects of the treatments; and the prognosis if the
1 0
patient foregoes treatment. 3
It is argued that statutorily designating the topics to be discussed
would serve not only to insure the patient's right to self-determination
but to protect the medical profession. A doctor would no longer be
faced with vague and ambiguous standards to guide his disclosure,
but would have specific guidelines that clearly delineate the degree
of disclosure necessary to constitute "informed consent."' 31
It has also been suggested that an "informed consent" statute
should identify the elements which must be established to warrant re127.
(1972).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
Note, supra note 110, at 555.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560-61.
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covery under the doctrine and indicate which party bears the burden
of proof. 1 32 One proposal based on the Canterburys- decision is that
the initial burden be on the patient to establish that a particular risk
or alternative was known or should have been known by the doctor"'
and that this information was not disclosed. 135 Expert testimony would
probably be necessary to prove that potential risks were known or
possible alternatives existed. According to this scheme, once the patient
establishes that adequate disclosure was not made the burden shifts to
the defendant-doctor to establish "a reasonable basis for nondisclosure."' 138 Thus if the doctor could show that an emergency existed,
or that the patient already knew of the risk, or that the disclosure
would so upset the patient as to threaten his condition or increase
the risks involved,' 37 nondisclosure might be justified. If the doctor
successfully justified his nondisclosure, he would be exonerated.
The Canterbury court discussed another factor involved in the
informed consent doctrine which perhaps should be statutorily addressed. The court pointed out that for the doctor to be liable to a
patient, a causal relationship must exist between the doctor's failure to
properly disclose and the injury incurred by the patient. According
to this court such a relationship "exists when, and only when, disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted
in a decision against it."13 The opinion suggests that the causality issue
is best resolved by asking "what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing
significance." 139
A useful and equitable informed consent law could be derived
from these proposals and principles. Such a law should contain the
40
following components: 1
1. A requirement that the physician disclose all material information to the patient prior to obtaining consent; "material information"

132. See, e.g., Stewart, The Duty of Obtaining Medical Consent, 48 FLA. B.J. 614, 618
(1974); Note, Informed Consent: Alternatives for Illinois, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 739, 755.
133. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
134. Note, supra note 132, at 755.
135. Stewart, supra note 132, at 618.
136. id. This point is also discussed in Note, supra note 132, at 750.
137. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Note, supra note 132, at 750.
138. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
139. Id. at 791.
140. The suggested components are derived from the cases, notes and comments
discussed in this section, especially Stewart, supra note 132.
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should be defined in terms of what a "reasonable patient" would consider material.
2. A list of topics which must be discussed by the doctor. This list
should be composed after careful consideration and substantial input
from the medical profession.
3. A provision placing on the patient the burden of showing:
(a) that certain risks were involved and alternatives were available,
(b) that these were not disclosed for consent purposes, and (c) that a
reasonable person would not have consented to the treatment or procedure if the risks or dangers had been known to that person.
4. A provision that the defendant could overcome the plaintiff's
prima facie showing of nondisclosure of a material fact by proving
that the failure to disclose was justifiable. The statute should enumerate
exceptions that justify nondisclosure.
5. A provision making it clear that the following are questions for
the jury: (a) whether the disclosure was inadequate; (b) whether
there was justification for the inadequate disclosure; (c) whether a
reasonable person in the patient's position would have decided against
the treatment if he had been properly informed of the potential risks
involved.
The Florida Legislature should either repeal the entire Medical
Consent Law or amend it in such a way as to render it reasonable, just,
usable, and decipherable.
B.

ProceduralChanges

1. Florida'sMedical Liability Mediation Panel.-Criticsof the traditional tort liability system, who believe that trial by jury in medical
malpractice cases is too slow, too expensive, and substantially unjust,
have devoted much time and thought to the search for a viable alternative to actions-at-law. The alternatives most frequently discussed include compulsory arbitration,'141 no-fault compensation for medical injuries, 1 42 and screening panels. 143 Arbitration of malpractice cases has
been used on a voluntary, contractual basis, but it has not yet been
made compulsory in any state-probably because of the constitutional
challenges which such legislation would precipitate.' No-fault compensation, similar to workmen's compensation plans, has also been ex141.

See HEW APPENDIX 214-449.

142. Id. at 450-93.
143. Id. at 214-314.
144. Id. 315-20. The main constitutional issues include whether compulsory arbitration would violate due process of law, deprive one of the right to trial by jury, result
in a denial of equal protection, or amount to an unlawful delegation of legislative or
judicial power.
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haustively discussed, but lawmakers have been reluctant to introduce
such programs because of the large sums necessary to initiate these programs. The screening panel concept, which requires that claims be
filed with the panel and "screened" before court action is commenced,
is considered by many to be a realistic alternative for many actions-atlaw and the idea has been well received by state legislatures which, in
the last 2 years, have created various "mediation panels," "medicolegal panels," and "medical liability mediation panels.' ' 145

Several variations of the screening panel approach are utilized.
The HEW Appendix describes four types: (1) physician screening
panels with "a decision-making body composed entirely of physicians";
(2) physician-and-advisory screening panels composed mostly of physicians but with a nonmedical person serving as advisor to the group;
(3) medical-legal screening panels consisting of approximately equal
numbers of legal and medical representatives; and (4) court-sponsored
screening panels, with the court system acting as a pretrial mediation
body. Various other statutory plans have been created by state legis146

latures.

Proponents of the screening panel alternative believe that wellconceived and carefully implemented plans will deter lawsuits, encourage settlements, and reward meritorious claims. According to
one commentator:
The goals and motives of malpractice screening panels are twofold: To prevent, where possible, the filing in court of actions against
physicians and their employees for professional malpractice in situations where the facts do not warrant a reasonable inference of malpractice; and to make possible the fair and equitable disposition
of legitimate claims against physicians.147
The possible advantages of a screening panel program include:
(1) The unsophisticated jury is replaced by knowledgeable factfinders who, because of their expertise, are more capable of distinguishing a meritorious claim from a frivolous, nuisance claim.
(2) Long delays between the initiation and final disposition of
lawsuits may be avoided, thus providing the opportunity for rapid
resolution of cases.
145. Ten states have adopted some form of medical review panel. National Center
for Health Services Research, Medical Malpractice Information, Legislative Briefs (Aug.
7, 1975).
146. HEW APPENDIx 224-47, 280-81.
147. Note, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical
Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MA.R L. REv. 695, 705 (1972).
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(3) The enormous expenes of actions-at-law is reduced because
the technical, formal, time-consuming procedures characteristic of a
trial are replaced by an informal and simple process.
(4) Unjustified, embarrassing lawsuits can be avoided if the
panel is successful in identifying nuisance claims.
The favorable aspects of screening panels have been summarized:
[T]he medical-legal screening panels, due to their expertise, should
be able to determine accurately the presence or absence of
negligence. The panels also are designed to encourage seasonable
settlement of just claims, thereby providing prompt compensation to
aggrieved patients, and they may ultimately have a stabilizing
48
effect on this factor in the cost of medical care.'
Certainly if all these advantages obtain when screening panels are
used, they would be of great value. But whether mediation panels
will, in reality, provide all the features that proponents espouse is
questionable. Critics of the screening panel alternative believe that
the following three serious shortcomings are common to most panels:
(1) their jurisdiction is limited;1 49 (2) appearance before panels is
generally voluntary; 5 0 and (3) the decision of the panel is not bind-

ing. 15 ' Nearly all the authorities agree that a voluntary screening
scheme, where acceptance of the panel's decision is discretionary or
where no strong inducements appear in the law to encourage acceptance of the decision, will ultimately fail to achieve its stated objectives.
During 1970 and 1971 Robert L. Winikoff, while a member of
the William and Mary Law Review staff, undertook a study "to discover

and analyze the substantive and procedural problems involved in the
litigation of medical malpractice suits, and to determine whether these
problems would be alleviated by the creation of medical-legal review
panels. ' ' 1 He attempted an empirical study based on data gathered
15
from medical societies and bar associations throughout the country. '
An analysis of the data led the author to conclude that:

Medical malpractice screening panels are, at best, only partially
successful. While in theory they appear to provide an ideal alternative to the traditional trial method for handling medical mal148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

id. at 710.
HEW APPENDIX 297-98.
Note, supra note 147, at 721.
Id.
Id. at 695.
id. at 711.
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practice claims, the fact is that in many areas the panel approach has
been a near or total failure.
.. For these reasons the medical-legal screening panel procedure for
medical malpractice claims, as presently constituted, is not the most
desirable alternative to the traditional trial procedure on a national
basis.15

Keeping the conclusions of the Winikoff study in mind, a consideration of the Florida "medical liability mediation panel" 15 5 scheme is appropriate.
The Florida law requires that "any person . . . claiming damages
by reason of injury, death or monetary loss on account of the alleged
malpractice by any medical or osteopathic physician, hospital, or health
maintenance organization and against whom he believes there is a
1
reasonable basis for a claim"156
shall file a claim with the clerk of
the circuit court and serve all named persons in the claim as well as
the administrative board licensing the professional involved. 5 7 Submission of the claim to a mediation panel is not voluntary; every such
claim must be filed pursuant to the provisions of this law prior to
the initiation of any suit at law. The medical-care provider responds to
the claim by filing an answer with the clerk within 20 days of the date
of service. 58 If no answer is filed, the mediation panel's jurisdiction
terminates and the claimant's only alternative is to file a lawsuit. 59
Assuming the potential defendant files a timely answer, within 30 days
after service of process each party must file with the clerk a document
designating the type of medical specialist who should hear the claim. 1 6
If the parties do not agree on the speciality, the judicial referee, a
circuit judge serving on the panel, will make the determination.- °' The
panel members-an attorney, a physician, and a judicial referee-are
selected by a process explained in detail later. 16' After the selection
occurs, the clerk sets a date, time, and place for the hearing. The
hearing must be held within 120 days of the date the claim is filed. 63
Upon a showing of good cause this time may be extended to 6
154. Id. at 721-22.
155. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133).
156. Id. (§ 768.133(2)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See note 180 and accompanying text infra.
163. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133(4)).
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months.16 4 If the hearing is not concluded within 10 months, the
jurisdiction of the mediation panel terminates and the parties "may
' ' 165
proceed in accordance with law.
Parties are allowed to utilize any discovery procedure provided by
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'66 The hearing itself is to be
conducted under procedural rules to be established by the supreme
court. 1 7 The law specifies that strict adherence to rules of procedure
and evidence is not necessary at the hearing. 168 During the hearing
[w]itnesses may be called, all testimony shall be under oath, testimony
may be taken either orally before the panel or by deposition, copies
of records, x-rays and other documents may be produced and considered by the panel and the right to subpoena witnesses and evidence
shall obtain as in all other proceedings in the circuit court. The
right of cross-examination shall obtain as to all witnesses who testify
in person. Both parties shall be entitled, individually and through
counsel, to make opening and closing statements. No transcript or
record of the proceedings shall be required, but any party may have
169
the proceedings transcribed or recorded ....
Within 30 days after the completion of the hearing, the panel is re70
quired to file a written decision with the clerk of the court.1 If
liability is found, and if the adverse parties agree, the panel may continue mediation "for the purpose of assisting the parties in reaching a
settlement."'' If any party rejects the decision of the hearing panel,
the claimant may institute litigation based upon the claim. 17 2 If such
subsequent litigation occurs, the conclusion of the hearing panel on
the issue of liability may be admitted into evidence"' but a finding
of damages is not admissible. 7 4 In the opening statement or argument to the court or jury, either party may comment on the panel's
conclusion;17 however, panel members may not participate in the trial
either as witnesses or counsel. 7 6 The judge presiding at the panel hear164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(§ 768.133(6)).
(§ 768.133(7)).

(§
(§
(§
(§
(§
(§
(§

768.133(8)).
768.133(9)).
768.133(10)),
768.133(11)).
768.133(9)).
768.133(11)).
768.133(7)).
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ing shall not preside at the subsequent trial,'1 77 and no specific finding

of fact made by the panel may be admitted in evidence at trial. 178
Superficially, at least, Florida's plan seems logical, relatively simple,
and workable. There are, however, problems with the law-interpretative problems arising from the use of confusing language, and substantive problems relating to the nature and content of the law.
The provision for selection of panel members, in particular, is
subject to interpretative problems and is probably too complicated. Although the language is far from clear, it seems that the selection process,
as described in section 5 of the Act, is designed to function in the
following manner. The chief judge of each judicial circuit is to prepare
lists from which the attorney and doctor to serve on the three-member
mediation panel will be chosen. One list is to consist of names of
qualified attorneys. In composing this list, the chief judge may accept
the recommendations of recognized professional legal societies. The
other list to be prepared by the chief judge is to contain the names of
doctors licensed to practice medicine in the state. The judge may take
into consideration the recommendations of recognized professional
medical societies concerning names suitable for this list. The list of
doctors shall be further divided according to specialties of practice.
Thus there would be a list of urologists, a list of heart specialists, and
so forth. When a malpractice claim is filed, a three-member panel, consisting of a judicial referee, a physician, and an attorney must be empanelled. The judicial referee is to be a circuit judge who shall be
17 9
appointed to serve on the panel.

In the event that the parties to the action cannot agree between
themselves on a doctor and an attorney, these members of the panel
are to be selected from the lists prepared by the chief judge. Five names
from the list of doctors of the appropriate specialty, and five names
from the list of attorneys would be selected at random by the clerk
and mailed to the parties and to the doctors and attorneys whose
names have been selected. The parties and the persons selected would
have 10 days to challenge the selections. If there are disqualifications
the clerk shall randomly select replacements from the lists so that five
attorneys' names and five physicians' names are under consideration.
From these two groups of five names each, the parties may agree on one
attorney and one doctor to serve on the panel. If no agreement is
reached on an attorney, each side shall strike names alternately from
the attorneys' list, with the claimant striking first, until each side has
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. (§ 768.133(11)).
Id. (§ 768.133(1)).
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stricken two names. The remaining attorney serves on the hearing
panel. The same procedure is to be used if the parties cannot agree
on a doctor. The attorney and doctor chosen by this elimination process
serve, along with the judicial referee, as the three-member mediation
80
panel.1
Although the preceding is a reasonable explanation of the selection procedure, ambiguities in the drafting of this portion of the Act
makes definite interpretation difficult. The selection provision states
in part:
All hearings, as hereinafter provided for, shall be before a threemember panel hereinafter referred to as the panel, mediation panel
or hearing panel composed as follows: a judicial referee who shall be
the presiding member of the hearing panel, a licensed physician and
an attorney. The judicial referee shall be a circuit judge. Such appointments shall be made by a "blind" system. The other panel
members shall be selected in accordance with the following procedure .... 181
A question arises as to what is meant by a blind system of selection.
One might reasonably conclude that a blind system means a random
system, but the term "blind system," being neither a term of art
nor words of common usage, should be defined and explained.
A valid question also may be raised as to what appointments are
the subject of the sentence: "Such appointments shall be made by a
'blind' system." Is the reference to the appointment of all the panel
members, or the appointment of the judicial referee only? One logical
interpretation is that only the judicial referee is to be chosen by a blind
system while the other panel members (the doctor and the attorney)
are to be selected in a different manner. This interpretation is
buttressed by the sentence "The other panel members shall be selected in accordance with the following procedure .... ." This implies
that the selection of the "other" panel members, the doctor and the
attorney, is not to be by a blind system. Since the sentence "Such appointments shall be made by a 'blind' system" stands alone, however, it
could also be meant to apply to the appointment of all three panel
members. One person involved in the drafting of the legislation has
stated that this was the intent.1 2 But such an interpretation would conflict with later provisions in section 5 (768.133(3)) of the Act which
180. Id. (§ 768.133(3)).
181. Id. (§ 768.133(1)) (emphasis added).
182. Personal communication with Jack Hersoz, Attorney for the Florida House of
Representatives Commerce Committee (Oct. 1975).
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describe a detailed method for selection of the doctor and attorney
members of the panel that is in no way random or blind. Because of
this later provision, the most reasonable interpretation is that only
the judicial referee is selected by a blind system and the attorney and
doctor are selected by the system described in section 5 (768.133(3))
of the Act. Assuming this is the correct interpretation, the language
could be clarified quite easily by providing that "the judicial referee,
who shall be a circuit judge, shall be appointed by a 'blind' system."
Thereafter, the law should describe how the "blind" system operates.
18 13
The statute states that only circuit judges may be judicial referees.
This provision may prove to be too restrictive. At least one other
state1 4 has broadened the definition of judicial referees to include
other judicial officers such as county judges, or masters appointed by
the circuit judge. This approach might be advantageous if crowded
circuit court calendars would prevent the prompt hearing which the
Act demands.
Another defect in the selection process provision arises from misuse
of the word "panel." Section 5 (768.133(1)) of the Act defines the
terms "panel," "mediation panel," and "hearing panel" as three-member panels each composed of one judicial referee, one attorney, and
one physician. Yet two sentences later the Act states that "the other
panel members shall be selected in accordance with the following procedure" (emphasis added) and goes on to describe how the lists of
persons to be used as a basis for selection of the three-member groups
are to be prepared. Obviously the drafters have used the word "panel"
to mean two separate things: the three-member group that hears a
particular case, and the lists from which the three-member groups are
chosen. The confusion between the three-member panel and the lists
from which the attorney and doctor for this panel are drawn is also
apparent in section 5 (768.133(3)) which provides that "the clerk
shall mail to the parties . . . the names selected at random of five attorneys who are members of the hearing panel and the names of five
physicians ... who are members of the hearing panel" (emphasis added). It is impossible to select five names of members of the hearing
panel, as these provisions direct, since by definition a hearing panel
can consist of no more than one attorney and one doctor. It is apparent that the lists compiled by the chief judge are being confused
with the three-member hearing panel chosen to hear a specific case. The
law should be revised to differentiate correctly between the lists of potential members and the panel itself. This could be done by consistent183.
184.

Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133(1)).
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:l-a (1972).
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ly referring to the lists as "selection lists" or some other appropriate
title which does not contain the word "panel." "Panel" should then
be used only in reference to the three-member group. Language discussing selection of names for the lists should be completely separated
from language discussing selection of panel members.
The complicated procedure outlined for the selection of a doctor
and an attorney for the panel should be eliminated in favor of a
simpler, more objective system. An alternative procedure would be
for the clerk to select the name of an attorney and a doctor at random
from the appropriate lists. If the person selected disqualifies himself
for cause, or if either party is able to persuade the judicial referee that
the person selected should be disqualified for cause, another random
selection from the appropriate list would be made. Additionally, the
parties could be allowed to exercise a limited number of challenges.
Such a procedure would provide a more objective process, in contrast
to the current provisions which give the parties a choice of 10 persons
from whom to select two panel members. The opportunity for either
party to "shop" for a panel member would be limited and the selection
process would be less complicated as well as less time consuming.
More troublesome than the ambiguity of certain language regarding the mediation panel is the problem of whether the panel will, in
fact, function successfully as an alternative to litigation. This author
suggests that the law as presently written is not structured to offer
a real alternative to litigation; consequently it might serve only to
lengthen the litigation process for malpractice actions.
One provision which might thwart successful operation of the
mediation panel is contained in section 5 (768.133(2)) of the Act.
This part of the law requires that all defendants against whom a
claim is filed must answer the claim within 20 days of the date of service. The Act further states that "If no answer is filed within such
time limit, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel over the subject
matter shall terminate, and the parties may proceed in accordance
with law."'185 Thus although the law requires that an answer be filed,
there is no sanction for failure to do so, and the medical-provider may,
by merely refusing to answer, avoid the entire mediation panel proceeding. For practical purposes, the result of this provision is that
the panel hearing is mandatory for the claimant but only voluntary
for the defendant. Any result which allows the medical-provider in
every instance to decide whether a hearing will be conducted is of
limited value. To eliminate this situation the law could provide that
if the medical-provider does not answer within the time period, a
185.

Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133(2)).
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panel would nevertheless be chosen, a hearing conducted, and a decision
rendered by the panel. If the panel makes a finding of liability, the
claimant may introduce the findings as evidence in a subsequent trial,
but when the panel's decision indicates no liability, the defendant may
not use this finding as evidence in any subsequent trial if he did not
appear at the panel hearing. The effect of such provisions would be
to penalize the defendant who fails to answer. It is likely that the
defendant will participate if it is clear that a hearing will be conducted
regardless of his presence.
Another provision which may serve to thwart the prompt resolution of claims is the provision which allows either party to reject the
panel's decision. Thus, even in cases where the medical-provider does
answer and a hearing is conducted, the panel's decision is not binding.
The rejection of the panel's decision will necessitate the litigation in
court of the same issues that were tried before the panel. Perhaps the
only way to assure that screening panel decisions are followed is to
statutorily mandate that the decisions are binding and final. The losing
party would be allowed to take an appeal, perhaps to the circuit court.
But such a mandate would change the nature of the remedy entirely
and raise several constitutional questions." 6 A more moderate alternative is to create provisions in the statute which, while not foreclosing the option of either party to reject the panel decision, strongly
encourage acceptance of it. The Act as written does not supply sufficient
incentives. Section 5 (768.133(10)) provides: "(10)
In the event
any party rejects the decision of the hearing panel, the claimant may
institute litigation based upon the claim in the appropriate court."
The following hypothetical situation demonstrates the unfairness of
this provision: A patient files a claim against a doctor, following which
the mediation panel makes a finding of liability and, upon further
consideration and pursuant to the wishes of both parties, also decides
that the amount of damages owed to the patient by the doctor is $6000.
At this point, the doctor decides to reject the panel's decision. The
doctor's rejection renders the entire mediation panel proceeding
practically void. The burden to go forward with a lawsuit falls exclusively on the claimant. If he fails to initiate legal action the entire
matter is over, in spite of the fact that he has received a favorable decision for $6000 from a panel of experts. Only when the claimant files
suit and proceeds to trial is the panel's decision of any value. In a
case where the claimant files suit the panel's decision as to the issue of
liability may be admitted into evidence. The inequity of the situation
186.

See note 144 supra.
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is obvious; it is another example of how this law favors the medicalprovider over the patient.
The statute would be improved if: (1) the burden to go forward
with an action-at-law fell upon the party rejecting the panel's decision,
whether claimant or defendant, and (2) the rejecting party, in order
to obtain a trial de novo was required to file suit within 60 days of the
panel's decision and post bond. Applying this procedure to the hypothetical situation, the defendant-doctor would still be able to reject
the panel's decision, but to do so he would have to file suit in the
court in whose jurisdiction the case arose. If he failed to file suit
within 60 days the court administering the panel will presume acceptance and proceed accordingly. To obtain a trial de novo, it would
be necessary for the doctor to post bond in the amount of $6000 plus
the estimated cost of defending the new trial. Of course the same conditions must be met if the claimant decides to reject a panel's decision.
An outcome of this type is preferable to that which will occur under
the present law because the rejecting party, whether plaintiff or defendant, has the burden of going forward with the appeal.
The following language would achieve the suggested result:
Any party to the hearing panel proceeding may reject the final decision of the panel as to liability or damages by filing suit in the
court in whose jurisdiction the case arises for a trial de novo. If
suit is not filed within 60 days following the date the decision is
rendered, the parties are conclusively presumed to have accepted
the findings as to both liability and damages. The party or parties
filing the suit shall pay a fee of the same amount as if filing an
initial complaint and shall post bond in an amount equal to the sum
of the award assigned by the hearing panel plus the estimated cost of
defending the new trial. The court shall set the amount of this
bond and may excuse the posting of it if the plaintiff files a sworn
affidavit stipulating that he is unable to post such a bond or if the
court believes such a bond would hinder the interests of justice.187
Such a provision, which would give each party the choice of accepting
the panel's decision or filing suit in court for a new trial, would
eliminate the unfairness of requiring the claimant to go forward with
the lawsuit despite a favorable panel decision. Additionally, the
necessity of filing a lawsuit, combined with a bond-posting requirement, would strongly encourage acceptance of the panel's finding.
Problems persist under the present law even if both parties accept
187. This is substantially the same language used in a draft prepared in 1975 by the
Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee of the Florida House of Representatives.
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the panel's decision. The Act does not require the parties to give notice
of their decision to accept or reject the panel's decision, nor does the
Act provide for court administration of the payment of damages.
Inclusion of the following language could correct this omission:
Within 30 days following the date of the hearing panel's decision,
the parties shall file written notice with the clerk, supplying copies
of such notice to each other, of their acceptance or rejection of the
decision. If both parties accept the decision, the party against whom
any damages are assessed shall render payment to the prevailing
party within 60 days. The award shall be subject to enforcement by
the court in whose jurisdiction the case arose.' 88
Some provisions of section 5 (768.133(4)) of the Act, which establish time periods applicable to panel proceedings, are also potentially too restrictive. The pertinent portion of the section states:
[T]he hearing shall be held within 120 days of the date the claim is
filed with the clerk, unless for good cause shown upon order of the
judicial referee, such time is extended. Such extension shall not
exceed six months from the date the claim is filed. If no hearing is
held on the merits within 10 months of the date the claim is filed,
the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall
terminate and the parties may proceed in accordance with law.
A valid argument can be made that a 120 day time period is too
long. One of the primary goals of screening panels is "to expedite
the disposition of cases, thereby sparing the parties the added burden
of time, expense, and emotional fatigue usually associated with prolonged litigation."' 8 9 A 60 or 90 day limit would give the parties a
reasonable time period in which to prepare for the hearing and at
the same time insure promptness. The statute should also contain
language emphasizing that extensions are to be granted only in extreme circumstances, and that lack of preparation by either party will
not ordinarily be considered an extreme circumstance.
The provision which terminates the panel's jurisdiction if the hearing is not held within 10 months' 90 should be stricken because the
same provision requires that the hearing, even where an extension is
granted, be conducted within 6 months of the time the claim is

188. Id.
189. Note, 13 WM. K MARY L. REv. 695, 705 (1972).
190. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133(4)).
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filed. 91 This obvious inconsistency weakens the 6 month mandate
and seems to indicate that the law does not mean what it says.
Another deficiency in the Act regarding mediation panels is that
the initial decision by the panel does not include a finding of damages.1 2 Only after a finding of liability, and if the adverse parties agree,
can the panel continue mediation "for the purpose of assisting the
parties in reaching a settlement.' ' 9 3 The HEW Appendix states: "The
second most significant limitation of screening panels is that while
the parties are advised about liability, no opinion or expert guidance
' 194
as to damages is given to them.'
A decision combining liability and damages gives the parties a
reasonable and informed benchmark around which to negotiate. 9 5
The usefulness of the panel's ability to propose equitable and sound
decisions which obviate the necessity for other legal remedies is
diminished when the panel's scope of review is limited to the issue
of liability. The legislature should consider revising the law to provide
that damages be determined along with liability.
The legislature might also consider giving the panel the authority
to propose and implement some type of annuity system in the form
of a reversionary trust to pay the medical and related expenses of the
injured patient instead of a lump-sum payment of damages. 9 Creation
of such a trust would reduce the amount of damages payable immediately and prevent a windfall to the claimant's survivors in the
event the injured patient dies sooner than anticipated.' 9 7 Consideration
should also be given to the inclusion of provisions which disallow the
awarding of damages for pain and suffering, the awarding of damages
which duplicate benefits from other sources, and the awarding of damages in excess of the amount alleged in the claim. 198 The
changes necessary to improve the medical liability mediation panel
portion of the Medical Reform Act may be summarized as follows:
1. The ambiguities regarding use of the "blind" selection system
should be removed, and the word "blind" should be defined.

191. Id.
192. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5 (§ 768.133(8)(9)).
193. Id. (§ 768.133(9)).
194. HEW APPENDIX 298.
195. Id. at 292-93.
196. See Hirsh, Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction, CASE & Com., July-Aug 1975,
at 4-5.
197. Id.
198. See note 187 supra. The rationale behind these limitations is that the award
should be restricted to that amount necessary to pay the tangible damages suffered by
the patient which are not covered by medical or other insurance.
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2. The definition of judicial referee should be expanded to include officials other than circuit judges.
3. The confusing use of the words "panel" and "lists" should be
corrected.
4. The method of selecting the doctor and attorney panel member
described in section 5 (768.133(3)) of the Act should be eliminated
and a simple random system substituted.
5. The provision which terminates the jurisdiction of the hearing
panel when the defendant fails to answer should be amended to
penalize the defendant who does not answer.
6. Changes should be made in section 5 (768.133(4)) which (a)
shorten the time period for conducting the hearing from 120 to 60 or
90 days, (b) restrict the granting of extensions, and (c) omit the
language terminating jurisdiction if the hearing is not conducted
within 10 months.
7. The panel should decide both the issue of liability and the
issue of damages.
8. The law should be amended to provide that the party rejecting
the panel's decision must file suit for a trial de novo and must post
bond as a condition precedent to the new trial.
9. Provisions should be included which describe a procedure for
notifying the parties, the panel, and the court of each party's intention
to accept or reject the panel's decision.
10. Provisions should be added which require the court to enforce
payment of damages awarded by the panel.
Unless the statute is amended to delete the provisions unfair to the
claimant, such as the portion of the law which tacitly approves the
failure to answer a complaint, and to add provisions which increase
the likelihood that the panel's decision will be accepted, such as requiring the rejecting party to file suit for a new trial and to post bond,
mediation panels will serve no practical purpose.
2. The Statement of General Damages in the Complaint Prohibit-

ed.-Section 8 of the Act creates a statutory restriction on the contents
of the ad damnum clause199 of a complaint. The section provides:
Damages.-In any action brought in the circuit court to recover
damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount of
general damages shall not be stated in the complaint, but the amount
of special damages, if any, may be specifically pleaded and the re199. That part of a complaint which describes the damages sought to compensate
for the injury alleged is often termed the ad damnum clause. In some jurisdictions it is
entitled the "prayer for relief."

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

90

[Vol. 4:50

quisite jurisdictional amount established for filing in any court of
200
competent jurisdiction.
This amendment prohibits a statement in the complaint of the
specific amount of general damages sought. The amount of special
damages sought may be specifically stated as may the requisite jurisdictional amount.
Sponsors of the legislation explained that often exorbitant amounts
are alleged as damages in the initial complaint; not only are these
amounts often unrealistic, but they also create an "atmosphere of
the spectacular and the impression of guilt." 20 1 It is thought that
elimination of the request for a certain amount of general damages
in the pleadings will decrease the publicity and sensationalism which
such demands seem to generate and which, it is argued, encourages
202
other dissatisfied patients to sue.
It is true that demands for large amounts generate much publicity.
It is not so clear whether such publicity has the detrimental effects
attributed to it. Nevertheless, the prohibition against specifically requesting the amount of general damages, as to malpractice suits at
least, is probably wise, since few benefits are derived from such
publicity.
An interesting question about this part of the Act is why the restriction on the ad damnum clause extends beyond malpractice actions to all wrongful death or personal injury actions. The result of
this provision is that in the future a plaintiff seeking damages for
personal injury arising from an automobile accident, for instance, will
not be allowed to specifically allege general damages although his
suit has nothing to do with medical malpractice.
Because the requirement of this section applies to actions other
than those involving alleged medical malpractice, the Act might be
constitutionally infirm. The Florida constitution states in part that:
"Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the
title."203 The subject of the Act is medical malpractice and matters
related to or affecting medical malpractice.2 0 4 Section 8 of the Malpractice Act, however, creates legislation which affects a class of actions broader than medical malpractice; it is a civil law concerning all
Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 8 (§ 768.042).
Florida Medical Ass'n, Proposed Professional Liability Legislation (1975).
HEW REPORT 18.
203. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
204. The first part of the Act states: "AN AcT relating to medical liability insurance
"
and civil law revisions concerning medical malpractice actions ....
200.
201.
202.
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personal injury and wrongful death actions. Thus the Act embraces
two distinct and unrelated subjects: (1) medical malpractice and
matters connected therein, and (2) the prohibition against specifying
general damages in a civil action for personal injury or wrongful death.
The case law interpreting article III, section 6 of the Florida
constitution is voluminous2 5 and no attempt will be made here to
exhaustively cite the cases which may support a constitutional challenge to the Act. One case, however, seems particularly on point. Smith
v. Chase,20 6 a 1926 supreme court case, involved a law whose express
subject was the licensing and regulation of real estate brokers and
salesmen, 20 7 and which included a description of offenses and penalties
therefore. One section of the Act, however, defined a crime of general
application to all persons, not just real estate people. The court set
out its interpretation of article 1II, section 6 thusly:
[The title must not express two distinct subjects; and the act must
not contain any provision that is not covered by the single subject
expressed in the title or that is not [a] matter properly connected with
208
or germane to the subject that is stated in the title.

Applying these principles, the court decided that the provision of
general application, which made it a crime for anyone to publish a
false statement concerning land, was "broader than and not properly
connected with the restricted subject of licensing and regulating the
business of real estate salesmen. ' ' 20 9 The analogy to an enactment whose
subject is medical malpractice and whose title is "The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975" is clear. To the extent the enactment
affects all persons bringing actions for personal injury or wrongful
death where no medical malpractice issue is involved, it is constitu2 10
tionally infirm.
This defect could easily be corrected by restricting the prohibition
against stating the amount of general damages to actions brought for
See FLA. STAT. ANN. CONsr. art. III, § 6 (1970).
206. 109 So. 94 (Fla. 1926).
207. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10233.
208. 109 So. at 97.
209. Id.
210. Colonial Inv. Co. v. Nolan, 131 So. 178 (Fla. 1930), a case in which the unconstitutionality of a statute was alleged on the grounds that both the title and the
body of the act contained two separate and distinct subjects, is another case in point.
The court agreed with the party challenging the enactment and ruled that a statute
embracing in its title and body "two separate subjects without logical connection"
violates the constitutional requirement that an enactment embrace only one subject
in its title.

205.
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medical malpractice. Until the prohibition is thus restricted, it provides another ground for challenging the Act.
C. Insurance Provisions of the Medical Reform Act
A major portion of the Act is devoted to provisions involving insurance. Aside from increased malpractice insurance premiums, the
most immediate and pressing issue which faced the 1975 Legislature
was a disappearing medical malpractice insurance source. 211 Insurers
were refusing to write new policies in Florida, and the state's major
carrier would have cancelled its group policy covering approximately
50 percent of the state's doctors but for a court order prohibiting such
action. 212 Legislative action to insure that medical care providers in
Florida could obtain malpractice insurance became urgent. A twopart solution to the problem, with provisions for a self-insurance plan
and a joint underwriting plan, was adopted.
1. Self Insurance.-Priorto 1975, the doctor's ability to self-insure
was limited in Florida.213 A group or association of doctors could

partially self-insure against claims of medical malpractice only if the
group had originally been organized for purposes other than the purchase of insurance and had been in continuing existence for a period of
at least 2 years.2

14

The law did not extend the self-insurance option

to hospitals and other medical care facilities. No group or association
had ever qualified to self-insure under the pre-1975 law.215 The recent
amendment to section 627.355, Florida Statutes,216 is an attempt to

encourage the formation of self-insurance pools. The amendment seeks
to accomplish this objective by: (1) extending the authorization to
self-insure to groups and associations of health care facilities as well as
individual providers; (2) providing that a group or association can be
composed of any number of members; (3) repealing the requirements
that the association must be primarily organized for noninsurance
purposes and that the association must be in continuing existence for
a period of 2 years; and (4) omitting the restriction that allowed
only partial self-insurance. The resulting legislation authorizes any
-group or association of physicians or health care facilities
composed

211. Note 3 supra.
212. Note 6 supra.
213. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-265.
214. Id.
215. Personal communication with C. Hunt Wester, Director,
Management, Florida Department of Insurance, Oct. 1975.
216. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 4 (§ 627.355).

Division of Risk

1976]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT

of any number of members' ' 2 17 to self-insure against claims of medical
malpractice provided the following conditions are met:
(1) Approval from the Department of Insurance is obtained;
(2) A medical malpractice risk management trust fund is established
to provide liability coverage; and
(3) Professional consultants for loss prevention and claims management coordination are employed. 218
Hopefully self-insurance programs will provide an economically
feasible alternative to the purchase of insurance policies and thus decrease the medical profession's dependence on private insurance companies. The success of the state's workman's compensation self-insurance
pool has been used to illustrate how such a plan could function success219
fully.
Apparently the legislative efforts to encourage the establishment of
self-insurance programs has been successful. On August 9, 1975, a
self-insurance trust fund established by the Florida Medical Association was approved by the Department of Insurance and will become
effective when 1,000 members enroll. 22 0 The Florida Hospital Associa2
tion is in the process of obtaining approval of its self-insurance plan. 21
The success of these plans remains to be seen. Since most claims are
not filed until the third year after the injury occurs, 22 2 it may be at
least that long before it is clear whether the self-insurance programs
will remain solvent. It may also be 3 years before a determination
can be made as to whether the self-insureds saved money through a
comparison of their insurance costs to the costs of similar insurance
previously available from private insurers.
2. Joint UnderwritersAssociation.-The provision of the Act which
authorizes the formation of a Joint Underwriters Association Plan is
producing an immediate impact on the malpractice insurance situation.
Section 14 (627.351) of the Act requires the Department of Insurance to adopt a temporary joint underwriting plan. 22 The purpose
of the plan is to assure the availability of medical malpractice insurance by establishing an association which will supply such insurance
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Memorandum to Senator John T. Ware, Minority Leader of the Florida Senate,
from Carl Adams, Executive Assistant, Feb. 13, 1975.
220. Florida Medical Ass'n, FMA-Professional Liability Insurance-Rules and Regulations, Aug. 9, 1975.
221. Note 215 supra.
222. Note 35 and accompanying text supra.
223. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 14 (§ 627.351).
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to licensed health care providers regardless of the risk the provider
might pose and whether the provider has previously been refused
coverage. According to the statute, all entities licensed to carry casualty
insurance224 in Florida and all self-insurers authorized to issue medical
malpractice insurance under section 627.355, Florida Statutes, 22 5 "shall
participate in the plan and shall be members of the Temporary Joint
Underwriters Association"2 26 (hereinafter "JUA"). The JUA is to
function for 3 years from the date of its creation and will be supervised by a nine-member board of governors consisting of five participating insurers, one attorney from the Florida Bar, one physician from
the Florida Medical Association, a hospital representative from the
Florida Hospital Association, and the Insurance Commissioner or his
22
designated representative, who shall serve as chairman. 1
On June 19, 1975, State Treasurer Philip F. Ashler filed with the
Secretary of State an Order adopting a temporary joint underwriting
association plan. 2 8 The plan, which went into effect July 1, 1975, is set
out in certain articles2 2 9 which were promulgated by the Insurance Department after consultation with insurers and the public.
Medical care providers who choose to obtain insurance through
the JUA will pay an annual premium assessed in accordance with sound
actuarial methods. Ideally the premiums collected will adequately
cover all administrative expenses, losses and loss adjustment expenses,
and taxes for the year. Since the association operates on a non-profit
basis, if the premiums generated during any fiscal year exceed the
JUA's total expenses incurred, the policyholders will receive dividends.
In the event a deficit occurs, each policyholder will be assessed an additional amount which may not exceed one-third of the annual premium.
If a deficit still remains after the maximum assessment is made against
each policyholder, such deficit will be recovered from the companies
participating in the program. The plan thus "spreads the loss" among
all of the insurers who participate in the plan.
The Florida Medical Association originally endorsed the JUA
Plan.2 30 The FMA believed that the JUA would provide insurance to
224. The insurers to which § 14 of the Act applies are described in FLA. STAT. §
624.605(l)(b), (j) and (p) (1975).
225. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 4 (§ 627.355).
226. Fla. Laws 1975 ch. 75-9, § 14 (§ 627.351(8)(b)).
227. Fla. Laws 1975 ch. 75-9, § 14 (§ 627.351(2)(c)).
228. Office of the Florida Treasurer, Order Adopting Temporary Joint Underwriting
Association Plan, June 19, 1975.
229. Office of the Florida Treasurer, Temporary Joint Underwriting Association, Plan
of Operation, June 9, 1975.
230. Personal communication with Mr. Allen Shiver, Manager, Florida Medical
Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association, Oct. 1975.
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Florida physicians at a lower rate than the FMA group policy rates.
When the operating plan and premium rates for the JUA were announced in July 1975, the FMA was dismayed to learn that the JUA
rates were higher than their group policy rates. It was also displeased
with the contingency assessment feature of the plan. Doctors reacted
angrily, calling the rates "exorbitant. '2'

31

A representative of the Dade

County Medical Association announced that "the Florida legislature
was unresponsive to the problems facing doctors during its 1975 session."132
It is the opinion of some that the FMA and other critics have
been too hasty in condemning the JUA Plan. The plan has certain
features which could make JUA insurance extremely desirable. The
most attractive aspect of the JUA is that it is not organized or intended
to produce a profit. Whereas health providers who are insured by individual or group insurance pay premiums which include a profit factor
for the insurer of approximately 5 percent,

33

those who obtain JUA

insurance will be participating in a non-profit venture and will receive
a rebate if any "profits" have accrued at the end of a fiscal year. JUA
policyholders also benefit by the fact that private insurance companies are required to make up any deficits which occur after
JUA policyholders have been assessed a maximum amount. The JUA
policyholders enjoy this deficiency coverage without paying a fee or
premium directly to the insurers. The JUA is also exempt from paying
premium taxes. Initially it was thought that the JUA would be required to pay a 2 percent premium tax from which the FMA was
exempt. A recent attorney general opinion, however, states that "[i]nsurance business written through the Florida Medical Malpractice
Joint Underwriting Association, as insurer, is not subject to the premium tax . .. because such insurance business would be within the
"234
exemption ....

Those less enthused about the JUA Plan point out that any decrease
in the JUA premium due to the non-profit nature of the association
will be off-set by another factor. Self-insurers will be writing on a
"claims-made" basis which results in lower annual premiums that JUA
policies which are written on an "occurrence" basis. 2 3 As long as the

231. St. Petersburg Times, June 27, 1975, at 26, col. 2.
232. Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 14, 1975, at 26, col. 2.
233. See note 215 supra.
234. 1976 FLA. ATr'y GrEN. Or. 076-35, at 4.
235. Insurance policies written on an "occurrence" basis cover the acts of alleged
malpractice which occur during the policy period regardless of when the claim is
made or the suit is filed. "Claims-made" policies, on the other hand, provide coverage
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JUA is temporary in nature it cannot use the more economical claimsmade rating method.
If these factors cause JUA rates to exceed the FMA self-insurance
program rates, the FMA plan will enjoy a large market and can be
selective in its choice of participants. In such a situation it is possible
that high-risk medical care providers would be rejected by the FMA.
The high-risk doctors would then be forced to turn to the JUA for
insurance. A large number of high-risk participants would increase
the likelihood of JUA fund deficiencies. The result of these deficiencies
could be that the casualty insurers, who are required to cover the deficiencies, would raise their rates to cover these losses. In effect, all
casualty insurance purchasers would be subsidizing the JUA insurance
program.' 6 The possibility of increasing automobile insurance rates
to provide doctors with "free" insurance is distasteful indeed.
Many persons involved in implementation of the JUA Plan be23 7
lieve that it will operate successfully only if given permanent status.
This would allow the more economical claims-made method of ratemaking to be used238 which would attract more participants and
stabilize the program. Legislation converting the plan to permanent
status has been proposed for the 1976 legislative session.22 9 Despite
all the speculation and predictions surrounding the JUA, it is too
early to determine the success of the plan. Only the passage of time will
reveal whether a sufficient number of participants will be attracted to
the program and whether large deficits in the fund can be avoided without setting high premium rates.
3. Patient's Compensation Fund.-The third section of the Act
only for claims made during the policy year no matter when the injury actually
occurred. Assume, for instance, that in 1974 Dr. X procured an "occurrence" policy
and Dr. Y, for the same year, obtained a "claims-made" policy. In 1976 both doctors
are sued for an injury suffered by a patient in 1974. The company insuring Dr. X with
the "occurence" policy in 1974 would be responsible for covering the 1976 claim, even if
it was no longer Dr. X's insurer, since the incident giving rise to the claim occurred
in 1974. Dr. Y's 1974 insurer would not be responsible for the claim against Dr. Y
because the insurance it offered covered only claims filed in 1974. Because the period
for which the "claims-made" insurer's liability is restricted, the "long tail" is eliminated
and the coverage may be offered at lower rates.
236. Tampa Tribune, Sept. 8, 1975, § B, at 8,col. 1.
237. The Florida Medical Insurance Liability Commission refused by a 6-5 vote to
recommend the extension of the Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriters Association beyond July 1, 1978. In a minority opinion, State Treasurer and Insurance
Commissioner Philip F. Ashier urged that the 3-year limitation for the JUA Plan
be removed. Insurance Comm'n Report, supra note 49, at 27-29.
238. See note 235 supra.
239. Commerce Committee, Fla. H.R., Proposed Committee Bill Relating to Permanent Malpractice JUA. The proposed bill passed out of the Commerce Committee's
Insurance Subcommittee on Oct. 6, 1975.
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which addresses the insurance problem involves an innovative attempt
to protect medical care providers from excessive liability for malpractice
claims by establishing a "Patient's Compensation Fund. '

24 0

Under the

plan, the malpractice liability of certain medical care providers 2 1 is
limited to $100,000 if the provider pays a yearly assessment to the
Fund and maintains a specified minimum amount of malpractice insurance. That portion of a judgment or settlement against such a participating provider in excess of $100,000 is paid from the Patient's
Compensation Fund. To be entitled to the benefits of the Fund, any
hospital, physician, physician's assistant, osteopath, or podiatrist must:
(1) demonstrate financial responsibility in the amount of $100,000
either by posting bond, establishing an approved escrow account in the
amount of $100,000, or obtaining insurance through a private insurer,
the JUA, or a self-insurance program; (2) deposit an annual fee in
the Fund.

242

For individual doctors the annual fee for the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1975, is $1,000; for hospitals the first year fee is $300 per bed.
The fee after the first year of operation shall be a base fee of $500
for individuals and $300 per bed for hospitals plus an additional
amount to be assessed against each individual and hospital based on
past and prospective loss and expense experience in different types
of practices and different geographical areas, prior claims experience,
and various risk factors. 43 The base fees may be adjusted downward, and
the additional fees may not be levied, if it is determined that the Fund
can tolerate a decreased income. However, the Insurance Commissioner
may levy a deficit assessment against all participants in the Fund if
the monies are insufficient to cover expenses and claims for any fiscal
year.14 4 A person or hospital having insurance or other coverage in
excess of $100,000 may also participate in the Fund. In such a case
the participant shall be liable for losses up to the amount of his
240. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 15 (§ 627.353).
241. The list of persons and associations appearing in § 14 (§ 627. 351(8)(d)) of the Act,
eligible for the Joint Underwriters Association is not the same as the list of persons and
associations in § 15 (§ 627.353(2)(a)), which are eligible for the Patient's Compensation
Fumd. Those who may contribute to the Fund include hospitals, physicians, physician's assistants, osteopaths and podiatrists. The persons and associations which may join the
JUA include hospitals, physicians, osteopaths, podiatrists, dentists, nurses, nursing homes,
and professional asociations composed of these persons or associations. The Florida Medical
Liability Insurance Commission Report recommends that "the same persons and associations thereof which are eligible for participation in the Florida Medical Malpractice
Joint Underwriting Association would also be allowed membership in the Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund ...." Insurance Comm'n Report, supra note 49, at 18.
242. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 15 (§ 627.353(l)(b)).
243. Id. (§ 627.353(2)(c)(l)-(3)).
244. Id. (§ 627.353(2)(c)).
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coverage, but shall receive a reduction in the fee that he must pay into
2 45
the Fund.
Participation in the Patient's Compensation Fund is voluntary for
physicians, physician's assistants, osteopaths, and podiatrists. If these
individuals decide not to participate, their liability for malpractice
claims is unlimited. Hospitals must participate in the Fund unless they
secure insurance, post bond, or establish an escrow account in an
amount equivalent to $10,000 per bed. 246 If a hospital chooses this
option, the amount of insurance, bond, or escrow furnished need not
47
exceed $2.5 million.2
The law provides a specific procedure by which claims are to be
asserted against the Fund. A claimant may file an action for damages
against a person or entity covered under the Fund, but unless the
claimant names the Fund as a defendant to the suit, he may not recover
from the Fund. 248 Thus in a situation where a claimant obtains a
$500,000 judgment against a doctor participating in the Fund, but the
Fund was not named as a defendant, the doctor, because he has fulfilled
the requirements for limited liability under section 15 (§ 627.353(l)(b))
of the Act, is liable for only $100,000, and the Fund completely escapes liability.
If the Fund is named as a defendant and if it appears that the
49
claim will exceed $100,000, the Fund must appear and defend itself.1
This appearance does not relieve the medical care provider's insurer
from the responsibility of defending the suit and the insurer
"shall act in a fiduciary relationship with respect to any claim affecting
the fund. ' ' 25 0 Whenever the Fund is involved, no settlement may be
agreed to unless approved by the JUA, which manages the Fund.
The Patient's Compensation Fund is generally looked upon as one
viable method of resolving some of the malpractice insurance problems.
An unanswered question is whether the Fund will remain solvent. This,
to a large extent, depends on the number of medical care providers that
choose to participate in the Fund. The distinct advantage of Fund
membership is that doctors and hospitals will be relieved of the difficult
task of estimating the amount of insurance needed to adequately cover
any claims that may be brought against them. By contributing to the
Fund and maintaining a minimum amount of insurance, they are
assured that no matter how large a judgment is obtained, their personal
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
249. id.

(§ 627.353(2)(e)(5)).
(§ 627.353(1)(c)).
(§ 627.353(1)(c)(3)).
(§ 627.353(2)(e)(1)).
(§ 627.353(2)(e)(1)).

250. Id. (§ 627.353(2)(e)(2)).
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liability will be limited to $100,000.2 51 Because the Fund, like the JUA
and the self-insurance plan, is untested, its success cannot yet be predicted or measured.
D.

Preventive Measures

Included in the Medical Reform Act are three sections containing
legislation designed to decrease the frequency of medical accidents and
injuries. The first of these preventive provisions requires all licensed
Florida hospitals maintaining over 300 beds to establish an internal
risk management program. 52 The program must be supervised and
directed by either a person on the administrative staff of the hospital,
a committee composed of members of the hospital's board of trustees
or board of directors, or the hospital's medical staff. 253 Those persons
directing the hospital's internal risk management program are charged
with three functions:
(1) The investigation and analysis of the frequency and causes of
general categories and specific types of adverse incidents causing
injury to patients;
(2) The development of appropriate measures to minimize the risk
of injuries and adverse incidents to patients through the cooperative
efforts of all personnel; and
(3) The analysis of patient grievances which relate to patient care
and the quality of medical services. 25 4
The statute, by mandating the creation of hospital programs which
use information concerning past incidents and patient grievances as
a basis for the development of measures to minimize future risks, adopts
an excellent method of reducing malpractice claims. The weakness of
the law lies in the fact that the establishment of internal risk management programs is required only in hospitals having over 300 beds. Only
49 of the 240 licensed hospitals in Florida have over 300 beds.2 55 Thus,
only 20 percent of the state's licensed hospitals are affected by these pro251. The Florida Medical Insurance Liability Commission recommended that the
Patient's Compensation Fund legislation be modified to provide "for the cost of corrective and rehabilitative procedures, and other out-of-pocket costs necessary in connection with a patient's care in-hospital medically related incidents." This coverage would
be funded by an admission fee charged to each person admitted to a hospital. Insurance
Comm'n Report, supra note 49, at 8-10.
252. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 3 (§ 395.18).

253. Id. (§ 395.18(3)).
254. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 3 (§ 359.18).
255. Personal communication with Patrick Haines, Assistant Vice President, Florida
Hospital Association, Oct. 1975.
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visions. There is no compelling reason why small hospitals should
be excused from establishing risk management programs. A minor
regardless
change extending these provisions to all licensed hospitals,
56
of size, would result in a major improvement in the law.1
The second preventive measure passed by the legislature appears
as a series of amendments to chapter 458, Florida Statutes. This chapter
assigns to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners the function of
licensing and regulating Florida physicians. Since 1969 the Board has
had the power to discipline licensed physicians for 14 types of
conduct.257 The 1975 legislation attempts to expand the disciplinary
powers of the Board by expanding the list of punishable actions and
conduct.2 58 One such addition authorizes disciplinary action for "incompetence, negligence, or willful misconduct."' 255 Another addition

alters the definition of unprofessional conduct to include "any departure from, or the failure to conform to, the standards of acceptable
and prevailing medical practice in his area of expertise as determined
-260 Additionally, the statute now authorizes the Board
by the board ....
to discipline a physician who has been "found liable for medical malpractice or any personal injury from an act or omission committed or
omitted by a person in his capacity as a physician . . . ."2 Finally, the
statute authorizes discipline when a physician has been removed or suspended or has been the subject of disciplinary action taken by any
professional medical association, society, professional standards review organization 6 2 or other professional body or by a licensed hospital
or medical staff.2 6 3 To insure that the Board will be promptly informed

of any such peer review, the law requires any person taking disciplinary
action against a physician to report such action to the Board within
30 days of the occurrence. The penalty for failure to report is a fine
in an amount not to exceed $500.264
256. The Florida Medical Liability Insurance Commission recommended that "[s]ection 395.18, Florida Statutes . . . be amended to include all hospitals of all sizes,
ambulatory surgical centers as defined in Section 381.493(S)(j), Chapter 75-167, Laws
of Florida, Health Maintenance Organizations and other areas of inhouse patient
Insurance Comm'n Report,
care, such as nursing homes and convalescent centers.
supra note 49, at 7-8.
257. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-205 § 2.
258. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12 (§ 458.1201).
259. Id. (§ 458.1201(l)(m)).
260. Id.
261. Id. (§ 458.1201(l)(o)).
262. "Professional standards review organization" refers to organizations established
pursuant to Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F, 86 Stat. 1429. Fla. Laws
1975, ch. 75-9, § 12 (§ 458.1201(l)(p)).
263. Id.
264. ld.
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Although the amendments sound impressive, more drastic steps
will be necessary to force the Board of Medical Examiners to function
as an effective regulatory body. The Board has had the power for
several years to closely scrutinize and discipline the medical profession,
but has failed to exercise that power. The preamendment language
of the Medical Practices Act, although somewhat vague, could have
been interpreted to give authority to investigate and discipline any unacceptable action on the part of a physician. For example, section
458.1201(l)(h), Florida Statutes, authorizes the discipline of physicians
who engage "in any unethical, deceptive, or deleterious conduct or
practice harmful to the public." Certainly the phrase "conduct . . .
harmful to the public" is broad enough to use as authority to control
most unacceptable physician conduct. Another preamendment provision, section 428.1201(l)(m), Florida Statutes, authorized the Board
to discipline a physician for any "departure from, or the failure to conform to, the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing medical
practice . . . or the committing by a physician of any act contrary to
honesty, justice, or good morals ... ." An active and aggressive Board

could have invoked this section as authority to take disciplinary action
against those guilty of negligence, malpractice, or other unacceptable
conduct. But the Board had traditionally been hesitant to regulate and
discipline the medical profession. Some statistics obtained from the
Board of Medical Examiners2 65 illustrate this point. During the 4year period from 1970 through 1973, 468 investigations were conducted. As a result, 12 licenses were suspended, three licenses were revoked,
and 17 doctors were reprimanded. This is an average of only 3 suspensions, .75 revocations, and 4.2 reprimands per year. These low
figures lead one to question the intensity of the investigations conducted
by the Board. Also significant is the complaint and investigation data
available for the year 1975. This data shows that during 1975,266 240
complaints were filed but only 106 investigations were conducted.
Thus 44 percent of the complaints received were not even investigated.
Although statistics indicating the number of complaints filed before
1975 are not available, it is probable that investigation of complaints
was similarly limited in previous years. These statistics indicate that
the Board has interpreted the scope of its authority very narrowly and
suggest that it may not be helpful to confer additional powers on a

265. Letter from George S. Palmer, M.D., Executive Director, State of Florida Board
of Medical Examiners to Honorable John P. Forbes, Florida House of Representatives,
Oct. 28, 1975.
266. These statistics cover the period through October 28, 1975.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:50

body that has failed to make maximum use of the powers it already
possesses.
Possibly a more radical approach will be necessary to induce the
Board to carry out its regulatory functions more conscientiously. One
method might be to restructure the Board in such a way that the
licensing and regulatory functions are separated. Under such a plan
the Board would be divided into two sections. An all-physician panel
would be maintained for licensing purposes and a panel consisting of
both physicians and laypersons would be created to handle regulatory
functions. The establishment of a regulatory panel whose sole function
is to investigate and discipline would emphasize the importance of
professional regulation and insure that an adequate amount of time
and energy is available for this important function. In the absence of
such a panel, the legislature should seriously search for a way to encourage the Board to earnestly perform its regulatory functions.
The last preventive section of the Act addresses the subject of
hospital disciplinary powers.2 67 Under the Act, the medical staff of any

licensed hospital is authorized to "suspend, deny, revoke, or curtail
the staff privileges of any staff member for good cause .
,,26s Good
cause which may precipitate disciplinary action includes, but is not
limited to:
(1) incompetence;
(2) negligence;
(3) being found a habitual user of intoxicants or drugs to the extent
that the physician is deemed dangerous to himself or others; or
(4) being found liable by a court of competent jurisdiction for
medical malpractice.269

This legislation is commendable in that it gives hospital staffs
heretofore unavailable powers against incompetent, negligent, or otherwise unfit staff members. The weakness of the statute is that disciplinary action is only authorized-it is not required or encouraged. A
stronger plan would mandate an investigation and hearing in any case
where unacceptable conduct is suspected or complained of.
A criticism may also justifiably be leveled against the part of this
statute authorizing discipline by the hospital staff where a staff member
has been "found liable by a court of competent jurisdiction for medical
malpractice. ' ' 270 This provision could be interpreted to mean that a
267.
268.
269.

Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9 § 13
Id. (§ 395.065(1)).
Id.

270.

Id. (§ 395.065(1)(d)).

(§ 395.065).
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hospital staff member involved in a medical malpractice lawsuit may be
disciplined only after a court proceeding is held in which liability is
found. The filing of the lawsuit, however, should alert the hospital to
the possibility that the physician named in the lawsuit may have been
negligent or may be incompetent. The physician should be subject to
disciplinary action as soon as the hospital determines that he or she
is incompetent or has been negligent. Realistically, the physician is
not likely to be subjected to disciplinary action before the malpractice
claim is resolved. Since the hospital is often named as a codefendant
in malpractice suits and since the hospital might also be liable if the
defendant physician is found liable, the hospital will not be anxious
to establish the negligence or unfitness of the physician.
Nonetheless, the time to begin an investigation into an alleged
act of malpractice is when the act complained of is brought to the attention of the hospital, not when a judgment is finally rendered. If
in fact malpractice has occurred, many patients will be exposed to the
risk of similar incidents during the period of litigation. The law
should require the hospital staff to initiate an investigation to determine if disciplinary action is appropriate immediately upon notice of
a lawsuit against any staff member. To encourage the hospital to conduct a thorough investigation, the law could provide that findings and
actions of the hospital be confidential, and hence not admissible before
the panel or before any court. To wait for the slow wheels of justice
to grind to a conclusion before hospital action is taken needlessly endangers the health and lives of many patients.
CONCLUSION

The 1975 Medical Malpractice Reform Act is a far-reaching attempt to alleviate the medical malpractice insurance crisis. A few of
the provisions of the new law may prove to be beneficial while others
are likely to cause confusion and to create gross injustices. The shortcomings of the Act are explained partly by the fact that the Act is
the product of the desperate, emotion-charged atmosphere which surrounded the medical malpractice issue during the 1975 legislative
session.
The Act demonstrates the need to approach the problem in a more
objective and analytical manner. One important analytical process
which should precede passage of medical malpractice legislation is a
cost-benefit analysis. An effort should be made to determine whether
the benefits to be derived from proposed legislation justify the costs to
the public. The potential consequences of reducing patients' legal rights
should also be carefully considered. The legislature should note that
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if the burden of responsibility for the injured patient does not fall on
the negligent doctor or hospital, it will most likely fall on the general
public.
During the 1976 legislative session the entire Act should be reviewed. Some of the provisions, such as those dealing with insurance,
disciplinary powers, and the internal risk management programs, could
be vastly improved by making relatively minor changes. The value of
other provisions, such as those which alter the statute of limitations,
the Statute of Frauds, and the informed consent doctrine, should be
scrutinized with care. The section creating medical mediation panels
should be revised in its entirety in an effort to clear up both technical
inaccuracies and substantive inadequacies. Finally, the legislature
should recognize that the long-term medical malpractice problem
cannot be solved by stop-gap measures such as those in the 1975 Act.
Although a divergence of opinion exists as to what has caused the malpractice crisis and how the situation should be handled, nearly all agree
that medical malpractice insurance rates will be reduced only when
malpractice claims can be resolved in an efficient, rapid, and predictable
manner. Use of the tort liability system can never be an efficient
way to resolve a disputed issue. It is by nature a slow and expensive
process. For this reason, the legislature should investigate the feasibility of creating an alternative method of medical malpractice claim resolution. Both binding arbitration and no-fault medical compensation systems are alternatives which should be carefully considered. The Liability Insurance Commission should also consider these possibilities.
No matter what action is taken, the medical malpractice problem
will not immediately disappear. The demands for rapid legislative
resolution will persist. Hopefully, the legislature in the future will
resist the pressures of the interest groups and cautiously and analytically seek a practical and realistic solution.
THERESA HOOKS

